Policy Responsiveness and Electoral Incentives: A (Re)assessment

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Abstract

Competitive democratic theory predicts that electoral factors enhance responsiveness to public opinion. Yet findings on the effects of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness point in different directions and comparative research remains limited, lacking of a systematic evaluation. We draw on previous work, expand the range of electoral incentives, and re-assess their role in influencing policy responsiveness by using spending preferences. We provide extensive tests of an Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis and an Electoral Proximity Hypothesis. Contra competitive democratic theory, time-series analysis from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States in twenty policy domains and nine different indicators for electoral incentives finds limited support for these hypotheses. Our findings have implications for democracy and question the importance of electoral pressures in explaining policy responsiveness.

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Most research that evaluates the effects of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness to public opinion starts with the assumption that electoral incentives enhance responsiveness. This assumption invokes the rational anticipation of future elections and implies that policy makers seek re-election and hence consider voters' reactions (e.g., Downs 1957; Strom 1992; Stimson et al. 1995; Bartolini 1999; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). However, comparative research on this topic is limited to the work of Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) and Soroka and Wlezien (2010), while relevant previous studies only marginally touch upon electoral incentives and primarily focus on political institutions (e.g., Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2015; Fagan, Jones, and Wlezien 2017).

We extend research on policy responsiveness to public preferences and consider two major electoral incentives: government potential vulnerability and electoral proximity. This is important for at least two reasons. First, comparative work on whether electoral vulnerability conditions policy responsiveness remains limited to vote marginality (Soroka and Wlezien 2010) and to how much the Prime Minister party and president are popular in the polls (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008) – a choice followed in single-country studies on Canada (Pickup and Hobolt 2015), the United Kingdom (Hakhverdian 2010) and the United States (Canes-Wrone 2004) – whereas the electoral proximity effect is better explored in the study of American presidents than elsewhere (e.g., Cohen 1997; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).

Second, not only previous comparative studies are scant, but their findings point in different directions and are not easily comparable because they use different measures for electoral pressures and public opinion. For instance, whereas Soroka and Wlezien (2010) use public preferences and a more static measure of vote margin, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) use public priorities and a more dynamic measure of government popularity.

Hence, we still lack of a systematic assessment of the impact of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness to public preferences across country and over time, and the above considerations prompt us to re-evaluate two hypotheses: the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis and the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis. According to these hypotheses, we should expect policy to be more likely to respond to public preferences when the government is vulnerable and when elections are approaching.

This paper tests these hypotheses using time-series analysis on spending in twenty policy domains across Canada, the United Kingdom and the Unites States. We employ nine different indicators of electoral incentives and find limited evidence that electoral incentives condition budgetary policy responsiveness. We find that when they occur these effects are generally small and mostly enhance rather than generate policy responsiveness and mostly materialise for issues that are important to the public. These results have implications for democracy and for applications to policy responsiveness of theories driven by party competition.

Our finding that electoral vulnerability and, especially, electoral proximity do not exert much of an impact on policy responsiveness is important for democracy. While previous work shows that spending responds to public preferences (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Jennings and Wlezien 2015), our finding of limited evidence that this relationship is conditional on electoral incentives suggests that budgetary responsiveness is not much motivated by short-term re-election strategies. We believe this is good news for democracy, for the connection between what the public wants and what the government provides is more of a direct one. Our findings thereby suggest that we should not overestimate the role of elections in this regard and that party competition-driven theories might be more successful in explaining responsiveness in more rhetorical and symbolic policy venues, such as executive

speeches, election manifestos and other party communications, instead of more substantive policy venues like spending.

The paper proceeds as follows. We develop our theoretical expectations in the next section. Then, we introduce the data, measures and methods. Next, we present our results and then discuss our conclusions and their implications for future research.

Theoretical Expectations

Policy makers tend to respond to public preferences on issues that are important to the public (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Burstein 1998, 2003; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005, 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This is arguably the most remarkable finding from the policy responsiveness literature.[1] Following the thermostatic model of public responsiveness and policy representation (Wlezien 1995), the responsiveness mechanism would function as follows: "where the public notices and responds to policy in a particular domain, policy makers would notice and respond to public preferences themselves; where the public does not respond to policy, policy makers would not represent public preferences" (Soroka and Wlezien 2005, 668; see also Wlezien 2004). In other words, the responsiveness mechanism implies policy feedback, which is "critical to the ongoing functioning of a political system" (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 15; see also Easton 1965). A great deal of research on policy feedback shows that policy significantly influences public opinion (e.g., Pierson 1993), and that policy effects depend on the relative specificity and visibility of government programmes (e.g., Page and Jacobs 2009).

[1] This finding is backed up by consistent cross-country evidence on policy agendas that policy makers' attention follows or is congruent with public issue priorities (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Jennings and John 2009; Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011; John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011; Lindeboom 2012; Bevan and Jennings 2014; Visconti 2018).

Competitive democratic theory posits that electoral incentives enhance policy makers' responsiveness to public opinion, because policy makers would be primarily driven by re-election desires (e.g., Downs 1957; Strom 1992; Stimson et al. 1995; Bartolini 1999; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999).[2] Interestingly, comparative work on the conditional impact of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness is still limited and lacks of a systematic examination. In their study on Britain, Denmark and the United States, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) show that, in line with competitive democratic theory, electoral pressures matter for policy responsiveness and governments respond to the public when they are unpopular. Their study is the first comparative work that explores the effects of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness.

However, due to the difficulty of collecting data on public preferences, to measure public opinion Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) relied on data on public priorities. This approach clashes with more recent evidence suggesting that public issue priorities do not influence government expenditures (Bevan and Jennings 2014; Jennings and Wlezien 2015) and concludes that 'spending is not responsive to public concern about the "most important problem" in contrast to relative preferences' (Bevan and Jennings 2014, 52; but see Wlezien 2005). The reason why public priorities would not have an impact on spending is that, since budgets have directional implications, changes in the most important problem/issue question are not directional, that is, the public cannot signal whether it wants more or less spending on a given policy domain (Jennings and Wlezien 2015). Hence, priorities are not seen as a good measure for policy responsiveness.

[2] However, note that re-election is not the only goal that parties would follow (Strom 1990) and that governing parties have intrinsic preferences over the policies they enact (see, e.g., Wittman 1977, 1983).

In light of the above criticisms against the use of public priorities when studying budgetary responsiveness, we believe it is worth testing again the effects of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness using available comparative data on public preferences. A first attempt was found in Soroka and Wlezien's (2010, 137-140) *Degrees of Democracy*, where the authors operationalize electoral incentives as vote margin, that is, the percentage of votes by which a government holds a majority. We start from here and propose a more systematic test on two main electoral incentives: government potential vulnerability during the election cycle, which refers to the electoral uncertainty governments face between elections, and electoral proximity, which refers to the pressure governments face when elections are approaching. Interestingly, while previous comparative work referred to the former, we are not aware of comparative research on the latter.

Below we present a discussion of these two concepts derived from previous theoretical and empirical research that emphasises the positive influence of electoral factors in enhancing responsiveness.

Electoral Vulnerability

The conditional effect of government vulnerability on policy responsiveness builds on Friedrich's (1963) notable 'mechanism of anticipated reactions'. That is, if governments aim to be re-elected, they will be more likely to reach this goal if they respond sympathetically to citizens' demands (Bartolini 1999; Downs 1957). Only if politicians are worried about the reactions of voters will they be 'constantly piloted by the anticipation of those reactions' (Sartori 1977, 350). This mechanism will perform better if incumbents perceive themselves vulnerable (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1977). Strom (1989; but see also Strom 1992) calls this mechanism performance sensitivity, while Bartolini (2000) uses the term incumbent vulnerability.

With the exception of Soroka and Wlezien (2010), who relied on vote marginality and found very limited effects on policy responsiveness,[3] empirical research, both from the United States and comparatively, has been using measures of government popularity in order to test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis. If measurement issues will be addressed in the following section, what matters here is government's potential vulnerability during the electoral cycle, for responsiveness occurs between elections. Empirical research finds mixed evidence that popularity influences responsiveness. Some studies report no particular impact of presidential popularity on responsiveness to public concern (Cohen 1995) and that 'unpopular presidents are not more likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed by majority opinion' (Canes-Wrone 2004, 487). Other studies show that more popular presidents do feel less pressure to promote policies in line with the public (for a review, see Manza and Cook 2002) or find support for a nonmonotonic relationship (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).[4] Elsewhere, the hypothesis that popularity increases responsiveness finds support in Britain, using Left-Right policy mood (Hakhverdian 2010), Canada, using public priorities on welfare

[3] Soroka and Wlezien (2010, 139) provided a basic test for the hypothesis on social domains combined and found limited evidence of a marginality effect only in the United States (the interaction between public preferences and vote margin was statistically significant only at $p \leq .10$), but not in the United Kingdom and Canada.

[4] Note that, in the United States, the impact of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness might be conditional on whether the Presidential party holds a majority in Congress. It might be the case that electoral incentives have a greater impact on policy responsiveness in cases of unified than divided government, for the President would have freer hands to follow what the public wants and the Congressional party may share the incentives of a president to be responsive to high salience public concerns (see Coleman 1999; Green and Jennings 2017). Unfortunately, our N is too small for fully testing this possibility empirically.

(Pickup and Hobolt 2015), and comparatively in the above-mentioned study on public priorities by Hobolt and Klemmensen (though the effect varies across policy areas).

Electoral Proximity

We now consider the other main electoral incentive, known as electoral connection (Mayhew 1974) or electoral proximity (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). As elections are at the heart of democracy (Dahl 1971; Powell 2000) and described as a powerful driver of responsiveness (Stimson et al. 1995; Manin et al. 1999; Erikson et al. 2002), their approaching generates an incentive for re-election-seeking governments to respond to the public. In fact, when elections are closer, politicians will find it faster and less risky to respond to public opinion rather than to attempt to change it (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Moreover, because voters are unlikely to observe the outcome of a policy choice made shortly before an election, presidents are more likely to cater to current opinion as the next election is coming (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004, 693).

The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis finds some support in the American presidential context, where re-election-seeking presidents are more likely to endorse popular policies in the second half of the term (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).[5] Yet results are inconsistent (see, e.g., Cohen 1997), and evidence from Spain reveals, instead, that policymakers are not more responsive to public priorities in the election year but immediately after elections (Chaques Bonafont and Palau 2011). Furthermore, other mixed evidence comes from political economy. For instance, some work suggests that fiscal policy tends to be systematically manipulated before elections (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000). While taxes are cut before

[5] Note that, although less relevant to us, a great deal of work focuses on US legislators' roll call behaviour and, in comparison with the presidential literature, finds wide evidence that legislators are more responsive to public opinion in the year they face re-election.

elections, painful fiscal adjustments (such as cuts in spending and deficits) are postponed until after the elections and this, in turn, depends on institutional differences (Persson and Tabellini 2002, 4). On the other hand, real economic expansions are not easily detected in OECD countries (e.g., Franzese 2002) and, in contrast with the opportunistic political business cycle (e.g., Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1978), some evidence is also found for a reverse electoral business cycle, at least with private fixed investment (e.g., Canes-Wrone and Park 2012). Yet it is unclear from this research whether spending follows public opinion when elections are approaching.

To sum up, we believe that an empirical (re)assessment of the role played by electoral incentives in policy responsiveness is needed because (1) evidence from existing studies points in different directions and (2) we lack of a systematic test validated against multiple measures.

Data, Measurement, and Model Specification

We test our theoretical expectations in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To the best of our knowledge, these are the only countries for which time-series on public opinion's preferences in spending are publicly available. Notwithstanding, these cases display high clarity of responsibility (e.g., Powell and Whitten 1993) and high electoral identifiability (e.g., Shugart and Carey 1992) and have been already employed to test the thermostatic model (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). As the policy output would not be the by-product of a coalition agreement and so governments would face no constraints from coalition partners to enact their policies, these cases are appropriate for testing the impact of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness.

Although appropriations would be better than outlays to measure spending (see Wlezien and Soroka 2003: 273-4), the former are available for the United States but not for

the United Kingdom and Canada, and so we use outlays. Data on government expenditure in Canada (we use consolidated spending) come from Statistics Canada and are combined from two existing, functionally consistent matrices (for details see Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 82). For the United States we rely on outlays measures from the Historical Tables published by the Office of Management and Budget. For the United Kingdom we rely on Soroka et al.'s (2006) re-recalculations of spending back to 1980. Following Soroka and Wlezien's (2010, 81) explanations, data are combined with two years of earlier data recalculated by HM Treasury for Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis. Data were adjusted for inflation.

Public opinion is measured by using relative preferences in spending. The survey question is typically the following: "Do you think the government is spending too much, too little or about the right amount on [policy domain]?" These items ask respondents to compare their absolute preferences and the policy status quo. Compared to measures of public priorities, spending preferences are a better approach to study policy responsiveness, as mentioned above. Following Wlezien (1995), we use a measure of net support for spending, by subtracting the percentage of people who think the government is spending "too much" from the percentage of people who think the government is spending "too little". This measure indicates the degree to which the public wants more (less) spending over time (Wlezien 1995, 985). For Canadian data we rely on Environics (and when missing from Pollara), for the United Kingdom on Gallup and for the United States on GSS (and Roper for missing years). In sum, by combining spending and preferences our data set includes data on Canada (1988-2005), the United Kingdom (1978-1995), and the United States (1974-2005) in the following policy domains for which both spending and preferences are available: Canada (defence, education, environment, health, transport, and welfare), the UK (defence, education,

health, pensions, and roads), and the US (cities, crime, defence, education, environment, foreign aid, health, space, and welfare).[6]

Since responsiveness occurs between elections, to test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis we are interested in governments' dynamic potential vulnerability.[7] Thus we

[6] Data on Canada are downloaded from Soroka and Wlezien's "Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion and Policy" Canadian data set available at: http://www.degreesofdemocracy.net/data.html. Data on the United Kingdom and the United States are downloaded from the Replication data for the Jennings and Wlezien (2015) article published in Political Science Research and Methods available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/27496. Due to some missing values in the UK and US preferences, we follow Jennings and Wlezien (2015) and use interpolated data in our analyses.

[7] Of course other measures exist, but they are either about institutional vulnerability or based on aggregate electoral data such as indices of electoral competitiveness, the closeness of electoral result, and the frequency of turnover (Schlesinger 1955, 1960; Ranney 1965; Stern 1972; Meltz 1973; Elkins 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Patterson and Caldeira 1984; Endersby et al. 2002; Grofman and Selb 2009; Blais and Lago 2009; André, Depaw, Martin 2014; Immergut and Abou-Chadi 2014; Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016). These kinds of measures are problematic when we want to study government responsiveness, for at least three reasons. First, we simply are not interested in institutional vulnerability. Second, responsiveness occurs not at election time but between elections, therefore using measures based on election data would be problematic if not misleading. Third, such measures are time invariant and artificially static for the whole election cycle, they are US-specific, measured at the district level and not at the national level, or designed for other purposes. It is much better, both from a validity and degrees of freedom/variability perspective, to measure potential vulnerability

primarily use data on vote intentions to compute our measures of vulnerability.[8] Government popularity (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010), measured using vote intentions for the government, provides the basic test for a measure of dynamic potential vulnerability. More recently, Bernardi (2018) built on traditional measures of government popularity and developed two measures of dynamic potential vulnerability which have been tested in the context of policy agenda responsiveness: Government Potential Vulnerability (GPV) and Formateur Potential Vulnerability (FPV). At their basis there is the idea that what matters is the level of vulnerability, that is, policy responsiveness is higher the more the government is vulnerable. GPV is computed by subtracting for each year the vote intentions for the relevant opposition parties from the vote intentions for the governing parties. This measure is based on the assumption that governments do not only care about their own popularity, but also about how well the opposition is doing at the polls. As considering all opposition parties relevant would be misleading, we rely on a quantitative adaptation of Sartori's (1976) criteria of coalition and blackmail potential based on recent studies on responsiveness and congruence (Bischof 2018; Bernardi 2018; but see also Lühiste et al 2017). Hence, the party must fulfill the following criteria: (1) the party must have been in

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with survey estimates for each year, rather than using the single value of the posterior elections for all the 3-5 years prior to the elections. Note that using measures based on voter's propensity to vote (Kroh et al. 2007; Tillie 1995; van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1991) would not solve our issue since such data come from pre-election surveys and hence not available at least on a yearly basis.

[8] Vote intentions data for Canada come from Environics, data for the United Kingdom come from different polls available in Wlezien et al. (2013) and Green and Jennings (2012), and data for the United States come, again, from different polls available in Jennings and Wlezien (2016).

government throughout the period of reference or (2) gained at least 5 percent of the votes and 5 seats in at least two elections.

FPV builds on the government and coalition formation literature (e.g., Warwick 1996; Martin and Stevenson 2001) and accounts for the possibility that what matters is the vulnerability of the formateur, i.e., the Prime Minister (PM) party, and that the PM party becomes vulnerable when it loses this advantage in favour of another party. Since Canada and the United Kingdom are cases of single-party (minority) governments in the periods covered in our analysis, the source of vulnerability cannot come from a coalition partner, and so FPV is computed by subtracting the vote intentions for the largest opposition party from the vote intentions for the PM party.[9]

Drawing on our previous work, we develop two more measures of vulnerability, based on the possibility that what matters for governments to respond is not that the government (or the PM party) is reasonably vulnerable but that the potential electoral outcome is very or completely uncertain. We take the concept of uncertainty from early measures of party competition (e.g., Elkins 1974) and adapt it for our purposes. That is, what may matter for us is that the difference in vote intentions between government and opposition (or PM party and largest opposition party) is minimal. We account for this possibility by creating two measures based on GPV and FPV, which we label Government Potential Uncertainty (GPU) and Formateur Potential Uncertainty (FPU). GPU and FPU are dummy variables that equal one if the difference between government (PM party) and relevant opposition (largest opposition party) is close to zero – we arbitrarily set a range between -5% and +5% to account for sampling error – and equal zero otherwise.

[9] Being the United States a case of presidentialism with a pure two-party system, the formateur argument is clearly less relevant here and the FPV measure would simply be identical to the GPV measure.

Since it was employed in previous research on government responsiveness as an attempt to capture government's electoral risk, we replicate our analyses with Electoral Marginality and for the United States we use congressional vote margins (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 137-140).[10] Another exception is given by Kayser and Lindstädt's measure of Electoral Risk, defined as "the expected probability that the plurality party in parliament loses its seats plurality in the next election" (2015, 243). This measure is based on the calculation of loss probabilities, which depends on seats-votes elasticities and past vote swings (for details see Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, 245-247). Although the measure is partly time invariant and not strictly about potential vulnerability between elections, we add it on board because based on loss probabilities and so indirectly concerned with dynamics. In addition, though not designed specifically for studying dynamic representation, the authors themselves acknowledge responsiveness as one of the measure's possible empirical applications.[11]

To test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis we rely on two measures. One possibility is that governments are more responsive in the election year than in previous years. Another possibility is that governments become more responsive the closer we get to the election time. Election Year is thus a dummy variable coded 1 for the election year and zero otherwise, whereas Electoral Proximity is a continuous variable measuring the years elapsed to election. All nine indicators are summarised in Table 1.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

[10] Data on marginality come from Soroka and Wlezien (2010). Note that for the United States we re-estimated our analyses while using presidential vote margins, which mirror the findings based on congressional vote margins.

[11] Data on Kayser and Lindstädt's (2015) LPR measure are available here: http://mark-kayser.com/data.html.

The Model

Since we are interested in studying how policy responds to past preferences conditional on electoral incentives, our dependent variable is [*POLICY CHANGE* (*t*)], which denotes the change in government spending between the current year and the previous year in each policy domain. The reason of estimating the dependent variable in changes is also methodological, as expenditures are considered as highly path dependent (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Jones et al. 2009). Unit root tests reveal that data are non-stationary and visual inspection of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions suggest that there is evidence of autocorrelation in the data. Given that in instances autocorrelation remains after first-differencing the dependent variable, we include the lagged dependent variable [*POLICY* (*t* – 1)] in our models (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995).[12]

One of our main independent variables is [*PREFS* (*t* – 1)] which denotes preferences in spending in the previous year. Lagging public opinion is important to establish the time order (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983). Since expenditures are quite sticky and it may take time to translate public preferences into policy, it is common sense to use past levels of public opinion to reflect preferences when budgetary policy is made (e.g., Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This is intended to reflect the reality of policymaking in

[12] Given the concern around the use of the lagged dependent variable (LDV) whereby its inclusion would depress the explanatory power of main explanatory factors and absorb part of the trend in the dependent variable (Achen 2000; Plümper et al. 2005), we re-estimated our models without the [*POLICY* (*t* – 1)] variable and our substantive conclusions do not change. Hence, we preferred to present in the paper results from the models that control for the past level of spending. However, the analyses without the LDV are reported in Tables S49-S51.

that the cycle of budgeting largely happens over the course of the previous year (e.g., Wlezien and Soroka 2003).[13]

For parsimonious reasons, the term [*COMP* (*t*)] that stands for "competition" subsumes our electoral incentives in the equations below. Whereas it is appropriate to estimate the Election Year and Electoral Proximity variables in the current year, it is less clear whether the variables measuring electoral vulnerability should be set at time (*t*) or at time (*t* – 1). On the one hand, one could expect that what matters is the current potential vulnerability rather than the past government (or PM party) vulnerability. In this case, the solution adopted, for instance, by Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) would be theoretically preferable. On the other hand, however, setting vulnerability at time (*t*) might be problematic to establish a relationship of causality between vulnerability and responsiveness. Since we appreciate that both current and previous levels of vulnerability may influence policy responsiveness but we also acknowledge the causality issue above mentioned, we decided to report the effects of POP, GPV, FPV, GPU and FPU for both current and previous year.[14]

[13] We considered the possibility that one year lag might not be enough for policy to respond. Thus we re-estimated our analyses with public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability variables lagged of two years. Although these analyses should be taken with extra caution given our already small N, we found no particular evidence of such a delayed (conditional) effect. The analyses are reported in Tables S70-S72.

[14] Given the way the lagged electoral vulnerability variables are created, in the empirical analyses we omit country-years when a new government emerged whose ideology differed from the previous government. This is because in these years the lagged levels of government vulnerability pertain to different governments. However, we consider successive governments with the same Prime Minister (or President) as the same and include country-years where there was continuity in the governing party but a new President (Prime Minister), for the

The main variable of interest is the interacted variable [*PREFS* ($t-1$) × *COMP* (t)], which denotes the conditional effect of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness. If the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis is supported we should expect a significant coefficient in this variable (direction depends on the indicator: see Table 1). If the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis is supported we should expect a positive and significant coefficient in the interaction between public preferences and Election Year and a negative and significant coefficient in the interaction between public preferences and Electoral Proximity.

Our models control for partisanship, [*PARTY* ($t-1$)], which denotes the party of the Prime Minister in our two parliamentary systems. The variable is coded 1 for the Liberal Party in Canada and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, and zero otherwise. In the US models we distinguish between the party of the president, [*PARTY PRES* ($t-1$)], coded 1 if the president is Democratic, and for the average percentage of Democrats in Congress, [*PARTY HOUSE* ($t-1$)].[15] Including partisanship in the equation allows testing the mechanism through which public opinion influences policy and reflects party control when budgetary policy is made (see Hakhverdian 2010: 849-850; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).

We estimate a series of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) issue-specific models for the United Kingdom and Canada (equation 1) and the United States (equation 2):[16]

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incoming head of government was closely associated with the outgoing leader's government (see Bernardi and Adams 2017). We re-estimated our analyses (reported in Tables S67-S69) while including those few omitted observations and our substantive conclusions do not change.

[15] We use the partisanship variables available in the same data sets of the spending and preferences data (see footnote 6).

[16] SUR models are preferred to OLS models since our dependent variables are unlikely to be independent, as they are part of the same budget. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this

$$
\begin{aligned}
\textit{POLICY CHANGE}\,(t) \;=\; & b_1 \;+\; b_2[\textit{POLICY}\,(t-1)] \\
& +\; b_3[\textit{PREFS}\,(t-1)] \\
& +\; b_4[\textit{COMP}\,(t)] \\
& +\; b_5[\textit{PREFS}\,(t-1) \times \textit{COMP}\,(t)] \\
& +\; b_6[\textit{PARTY}\,(t-1)] \qquad . \quad (1)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\textit{POLICY CHANGE}\,(t) \;=\; & b_1 \;+\; b_2[\textit{POLICY}\,(t-1)] \\
& +\; b_3[\textit{PREFS}\,(t-1)] \\
& +\; b_4[\textit{COMP}\,(t)] \\
& +\; b_5[\textit{PREFS}\,(t-1) \times \textit{COMP}\,(t)] \\
& +\; b_6[\textit{PARTY PRES}\,(t-1)] \\
& +\; b_7[\textit{PARTY HOUSE}\,(t-1)] \qquad . \quad (2)
\end{aligned}
$$

Results

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suggestion. Further, we note that, given our small N, in the paper we only report the results for our basic models without over controlling for any additional factors. In particular, since controlling for economic indicators does not subvert the validity of the main conclusions drawn from our basic models (these analyses are reported in Table S64-S66), we opted for a parsimonious strategy and decided to exclude such variables from the analyses. Also, as some readers might want to see the analyses for the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis and the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for the other electoral incentive, we report these analyses in Tables S52-S63.

Since our analyses produced a large number of regression tables that would hardly fit in the paper, we present a summary table of our results and report all analyses based on 36 regression tables in the Online Appendix.

Before examining the impact of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness it is worth mentioning whether responsiveness occurs at all. These models are reported in Tables S37-42 and, in line with previous studies, show that governments do respond to preferences in some policy domains but not in others, independently on electoral incentives. This is the case for defence, education, environment, health and welfare in Canada, defence, education and health in the UK, and defence, education, environment, health, space and welfare in the US.

Table 2 shows the results of the country- and issue-specific analyses. The first column of the matrix reports the nine indicators of the electoral incentives considered by country. To each indicator corresponds the policy domain available for the country. Each cell reports the value of the sign and statistical significance (at $p \leq .01$ and $p \leq .05$) of the coefficient for the [*PREFS* $(t-1) \times$ *COMP* (t)] interacted variable. Value "V" denotes that either Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 is supported, meaning that the coefficient of the interacted variable is statistically significant in the expected direction (see Table 1). Value "X" denotes that the hypotheses are not supported, meaning that the interacted variable is not statistically significant in the expected direction at the above conventional levels. As for above, for some of the indicators used to test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis we present these values for the electoral incentive term set at both time (t) and time ($t-1$) separated by the vertical line. The last column reports the total number of policy domains in which the electoral incentive is statistically significant in the expected direction (again, at both (t) and ($t-1$) for some of the indicators used to test Hypothesis 1).

We can now examine our results. As a general overview, by looking at the last column in Table 2 we note that electoral incentives have a limited impact on policy responsiveness in

the countries included in the analysis. That is, the number of issues by country where our measures have a conditional effect on budgetary responsiveness to public opinion is considerably small. This is especially the case for our electoral proximity measures, in that the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis is almost always disconfirmed. However, more variation across countries and measures of electoral vulnerability exists, with more static indicators (marginality and risk) being almost always insignificant.

The UK is where we find the lowest impact in only two domains and one measure (FPU).[17] In Canada and the US the picture is less negative. In Canada, when electoral pressure is measured as GPU, the effect on policy responsiveness is found in four out of six policy domains (defence, education, environment and transport), and what seems to matter more is the current rather than the previous level of GPU. In turn, GPV and popularity have an effect only for transport and welfare, but timing differs. Unlike Canada, the US shows a wider impact of GPU across issues (five out of nine). That is, what matters most for US administrations is their potential electoral uncertainty rather than their extreme electoral vulnerability. Yet timing varies, again: in some issues the pressure is immediate, whereas in other issues the pressure takes longer to kick in. Instead, GPV and popularity report an effect only in one domain (education).[18]

As for the size of the effects detected, coefficients and standard deviations reported in the tables reveal that they are generally small with few exceptions. Figure 1 provides a

[17] The analyses with GPU are excluded in the UK because the indicator never falls within the values identified for uncertainty in Table 1. We also note that in UK analyses, the partisan variable is omitted because all governments are from the Conservative Party.

[18] For the US we only report GPV and GPU but not FPV and FPU because both sets of indicators are always computed between Democrats and Republicans, and so the measures are identical.

graphical illustration of such effects, plotting predictive margins, one example per country, based on Table 2.

At last, we considered the possibility that, as responsiveness can be collective and more pronounced when a similar set of domains is taken together (e.g., Wlezien 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), so might be the impact of electoral incentives. We explored this possibility by analysing the effect of our measures on policy responsiveness in major social domains combined. Following Wlezien (2004), social domains include education, health and welfare (pensions in the UK). We use total spending and average net support in social domains. These analyses, again, report limited effects of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness (only in the UK – the case where we observed least influence of electoral incentives on budgetary responsiveness – we found evidence that two of our measures have a conditional effect on policy responsiveness in social domains combined in the expected direction) and are available in Tables S73-S75.[19]

In sum, our analysis extends the research on the effectiveness of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness and suggests that electoral incentives have a limited impact on government responsiveness in budgetary policy, and our main conclusions are robust to alternative model specifications.

[19] Though not advisable with very small number of observations (e.g., Jennings 2013), as a final test, we have also re-estimated our analyses by using an error correction model (ECM) in order to capture some short- and long-term effects (analyses are available upon request). Although these analyses should be taken with extra caution, only in a handful of occasions the interaction between changes in public opinion and electoral incentives was statistically significant in the expected direction, supporting our findings of a limited impact of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness.

Sensitivity Analysis

A final consideration that is worth addressing is in which policy domains we find our effects. Conventional wisdom assumes that electoral incentives *enhance* responsiveness. That is, we should theoretically expect responsiveness on issues that are important to the public to be more likely when electoral incentives urge. We can easily check this and the feedback part of the thermostatic model shows us the way: if electoral incentives have an impact (in the expected direction) on policy representation to public preferences on issues the public cares the most, then we should find evidence of public responsiveness in those issues in the first place. We present this test in Table 3 where we report, in the first column, the policy domains in which we found any effect of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness (see Table 2). The values Yes/No in the second and third columns denote whether the coefficient of reference for the policy representation (preferences at time $t - 1$) and public responsiveness (policy at time t), respectively, was statistically significant at conventional levels, along with the sign of the coefficient. The full analyses are reported in Tables S37-48, respectively.[20]

[20] Note that whether the sign of the coefficient for public preferences in the policy representation analyses should be positive, the sign of the coefficient for policy in the public responsiveness analyses can be either negative, if a negative feedback prevails, or positive, if a positive feedback prevails (for a full discussion on feedback, see Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 29-30). The dependent variable in the public responsiveness model is estimated in levels (e.g., see Soroka and Wlezien 2005). Like in previous analyses, the analyses on public responsiveness control for the lagged dependent variable, which indeed appears to be strongly significant in all instances. Without the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable we find four more cases of public responsiveness (Tables S44, S46 and S48). However, this difference does not undermine the conclusions we can draw from Table 3.

From Table 3 we can draw two main conclusions. First, the second column suggests that, within the minority of issues per country where electoral incentives seem to have an effect on budgetary responsiveness to public opinion, the majority of these issues are cases of an enhancing effect of those incentives. Second, the third column suggests that, in the majority of cases where budgetary responsiveness to public opinion (conditional on electoral incentives) takes place, public responsiveness also takes place, and the number is even larger if we consider the public responsiveness analyses without controlling for the lagged dependent variable (see symbol † in Table 3). To conclude, if we take public responsiveness on a given issue as an indicator that the issue is important to the public, then these analyses seem suggesting that electoral incentives have a conditional effect on budgetary responsiveness to public opinion on those issues that are important to the public – but this varies across measures and issues.

Conclusion and Discussion

This paper challenged the assumption from competitive democratic theory that elections (and their incentives) enhance the opinion-policy link. Our paper used data on public preferences and spending in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States in a variety of policy domains. By using nine different indicators for incentives produced by electoral competition (see Table 1), we found limited evidence for the expectations that government vulnerability and electoral proximity have an impact on policy responsiveness. Like in previous research, we found evidence of direct policy representation in several domains, independently of any electoral incentive. But contra competitive democratic theory, when the latter are interacted with public opinion, we found considerably limited support for the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis and even a more negative assessment for the Electoral Proximity Hypotheses.

Our findings extend the research on democratic responsiveness in at least three ways. First, applications of the thermostatic model have been more interested in disentangling the mechanisms between responsiveness and political institutions. By using preferences and spending, we contribute to this research line adding an important piece that was still underexplored. Second, our results contradict findings from previous research that analysed policy responsiveness using public priorities to measure public opinion. Unlike past work, we find that electoral pressures show lower impact on policy responsiveness than we previously thought, at least with spending. Note, however, that our sensitivity analysis seems to find support for an enhancing effect of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness, in that the effect of the latter, though generally small, is more likely for issues that are important to the public. Third, our paper speaks well to the comparative research that identifies factors that exert little impact on change in budgetary policy. While previous research focuses on government partisanship (Epp et al 2014; Loftis and Mortensen 2017), we contribute to this literature and add government vulnerability and electoral proximity to the list.

Our results come with some limitations, since they are based on a small number of observations, available yearly, and limited to one policy indicator (spending). If a longer and more nuanced time-series would be useful, on the other hand we should not necessarily expect similar patterns in other policy venues. This makes intuitively sense, because governments might not expect to be punished in such a technical subject as budgetary policy, as citizens have an incentive not to invest in information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) and would cue more easily off of party brands (Lau and Redlawski 2001) instead of following 'day-to-day policy-making activities' (see e.g., Fortunato and Stevenson 2013).

In addition, budgetary policy is highly incremental and only occasionally punctuated by large changes (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Breunig 2006; Jones et al. 2009). Changing budgets (and observing the effects of this change) simply takes time. Given the

incremental, path-dependent nature of policy changes in Western democracies (e.g., Pierson 2004), one might expect short-term electoral incentives to exert little impact on policy responsiveness and that even the latter would be subject to the 'empirical law of public budgets' observed by Jones et al. (2009). Moreover, when setting budgets, policy makers are often constrained by veto players (Tsebelis 1995) as well as social, economic and international realities largely beyond their control (Epp et al. 2014) that can change policymakers' priorities (Adler and Wilkinson 2012). For instance, external factors like globalisation and the European integration process, or internal factors like the pressures of an ageing population can be timelier and may over-ride short-term electoral considerations (Mair 2013; Lipsmeyer et al. 2017). To be clear, this all does not mean that public opinion does not matter for policy change. Rather our findings suggest that electoral incentives matter less for spending and that the public opinion effect, when existing, is more likely to be direct than conditional.

However, our paper does not rule out that there might be other mechanisms in place. For instance, whereas we find that electoral vulnerability does not have much of an effect on spending (as well as on responsiveness), it may very well be the case that spending influences government popularity. Recent work on the costs of governing shows exactly that governing parties are punished when they spend more on social welfare (Bernardi and Adams 2017) and so the relationship between spending and popularity would be reversed.[21]

Future research should develop in at least three directions. First, our analysis was confined only to cases of single-party government. Hence, it is hard to say whether our findings are robust in other contexts were coalition governments are the norm. Beyond the

[21] However, we tried whether past spending influences opinion change conditional on (current and past) electoral vulnerability but we did not find much evidence of elite manipulation. Analyses are available upon request.

discussion that more proportional systems and consensual democracies are better or worse for promoting representation and responsiveness (e.g., Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000) remains that we still cannot rule out the possibility that electoral incentives might matter differently for policy responsiveness in coalition governments when the PM party's advantage of being the formateur is at risk vis-à-vis its junior coalition partners. This is still an open question, especially because the issue of whether coalition governments are more frictional (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2015) or more flexible (McGann and Latner 2013) is far from being resolved. Second, scholars should test our hypotheses in other stages of policy making (such as policy or legislative proposals) or in more rhetorical policy venues. Hakhverdian's (2010) article on Left-Right positions and executive speeches is a good starting point, whereas Lax and Phillips' (2009, 2012) policy coding approach on the US states is an interesting way to go. Third, our findings based on *position* do not necessarily apply to *attention*. For instance, Green and Jennings (2017) find that issue competence effects on executive and legislative agendas are moderated by public issue salience and government popularity. Future research should test whether electoral incentives condition the relationship between public and policy priorities, and Bernardi's (2018) work goes in this direction. Finally, yearly time-series analysis might not be the optimal tool to capture the effects of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness. Hence, future research should make an effort to collect data at a lower level or combine more in-depth event-based approaches.

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Figure 1. Effects of Electoral Incentives on Policy Responsiveness



Notes. The figure reports an illustration of the effects of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness based on the statistically significant interactions between preferences and electoral incentives (Table 2). Predictive margins are computed from the models reported in the Online Appendix: Table S4 for Welfare (CA); Table S23 for Defence (UK); Table S34 for Health (US). The variables are defined in the text.

Table 1. Operationalization of Electoral Incentives

Electoral Incentives	Indicator	H1 / H2	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Vote marginality (MARG)	Percentage of votes by which a government holds a majority	-	23.5	4.4	0.3	58.6
Electoral risk (LPR)	Loss probabilities depending on seats-votes elasticities and past vote swings	+	0.3	0.2	0	0.6
Government popularity (POP)	Vote intentions government	-	40.5	7.1	8.9	67.2
Government potential vulnerability (GPV)	Vote intentions government – vote intentions opposition	-	-8.6	13.8	-51.6	34.5
Formateur potential vulnerability (FPV)	Vote intentions PM party – vote intentions major competitor	-	5.8	12.6	-23.7	34.5
Government potential uncertainty (GPU)	1 = government potential vulnerability ≥ -5%, government potential vulnerability ≤ 5%; 0 = otherwise	+	0.3	0.5	0	1
Formateur potential uncertainty (FPU)	1 = formateur potential vulnerability ≥ -5%, formateur potential vulnerability ≤ 5%; 0 = otherwise	+	0.3	0.5	0	1
Election year (ELECYEAR)	1 = election year; 0 = otherwise	+	0.2	0.4	0	1
Electoral proximity (ELECPROX)	Years elapsed to election	-	1.6	1.2	0	4

Table 2. Summary of Results

Canada (1988-2004)	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**				***Total 6***
Vote margin (t-1)	X	X	X	X	X	X				0
Electoral risk (t)	X	X	X	X	**V**	X				1
Government popularity (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	**V** | X	X | **V**				1 | 1
Government potential vulnerability (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	**V** | X	X | **V**				1 | 1
Formateur potential vulnerability (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	**V** | X	X | **V**				1 | 1
Government potential uncertainty (t | t-1)	**V** | **V**	**V** | X	**V** | X	X | X	X | **V**	X | X				3 | 2
Formateur potential uncertainty (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X				0 | 0
Election year (t)	X	X	X	X	**V**	X				1
Electoral proximity (t)	X	X	X	X	**V**	X				1
United Kingdom (1980-1995)	**Defence**	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**					***Total 5***
Vote margin (t-1)	X	X	X	X	X					0
Electoral risk (t)	X	X	X	X	X					0
Government popularity (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X					0 | 0
Government potential vulnerability (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X					0 | 0
Formateur potential vulnerability (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X					0 | 0
Formateur potential uncertainty (t | t-1)	**V** | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | **V**					1 | 1
Election year (t)	X	X	X	X	X					0
Electoral proximity (t)	X	X	X	X	X					0
United States (1974-2005)	**Cities**	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**	***Total 9***
Vote margin (t-1)	X	X	X	**V**	X	X	X	X	X	1
Electoral risk (t)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0
Government popularity (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	**V** | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	1 | 0
Government potential vulnerability (t | t-1)	X | X	X | X	X | X	**V** | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	X | X	1 | 0
Government potential uncertainty (t | t-1)	X | X	**V** | X	X | **V**	**V** | X	X | **V**	X | X	**V** | **V**	X | X	X | X	3 | 3
Election year (t)	**V**	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1
Electoral proximity (t)	X	X	**V**	X	X	X	X	X	X	1

Notes. The table reports the values of the effects of the interactions between public preferences for spending and each measure of electoral incentives on spending change based on the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models reported in the Online Appendix (Tables S1-S36). "V" means that Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 is supported (** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.); "X" means that Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability and uncertainty are tested at both time (t) and time ($t - 1$). The variables are defined in the text.

Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Electoral Incentives Effects

Effect of Electoral Incentive on Policy Responsiveness by Domain	Policy Representation	Public Responsiveness
Defence (CA)	Yes (+)	No (-)
Education (CA)	Yes (+)	No (-)†
Environment (CA)	Yes (+)	No (-)†
Transport (CA)	No (+)	Yes (-)
Welfare (CA)	Yes (+)	No (+)
Defence (UK)	Yes (+)†	Yes (-)
Roads (UK)	No (-)	Yes (-)
Cities (US)	No (-)	Yes (-)
Crime (US)	No (-)	Yes (-)
Defence (US)	Yes (+)	Yes (-)
Education (US)	Yes (+)	No (-)†
Environment (US)	Yes (+)	Yes (-)†
Health (US)	Yes (+)	No (+)†

Notes. For the policy domains (and countries in parentheses) in which any electoral incentives were found to have an effect in Table 2, the table reports whether the coefficients for public preferences at time ($t - 1$), in the policy representation models, and for policy at time (t), in the public responsiveness models, were statistically significant (Yes/No) at conventional levels (** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.) together with their sign (+/-). The symbol † means that the coefficient was/was not statistically significant in the analyses without controlling for the lagged dependent variable. The full analyses are reported in the Online Appendix in Tables S37, S39 and S41 for policy representation and Tables S43, S45 and S47 for public responsiveness.

Online Appendix for "Policy Responsiveness and Electoral Incentives: A (Re)assessment"

Table S1. Analyses of Vote Margin (t – 1) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.21	-.05	-.26**	-.03	-.53*	.16*
	(.11)	(.08)	(.10)	(.04)	(.25)	(.18)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.02	.04	.07**	.25	-.02	-.07
	(.01)	(.12)	(.01)	(.15)	(.03)	(.15)
$MARGIN_{t-1}$	-.10*	-.31	.27	.95	.03	.35
	(.04)	(.86)	(.07)	(.92)	(.08)	(.25)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARGIN_{t-1}$	**-.00**	**.00**	**-.01****	**-.01**	**.01**	**.03**
	(.00)	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.02)**
$PARTY_t$	-1.11**	-2.33**	.15	-1.89**	-.32	-6.85**
	(.30)	(.78)	(.29)	(.72)	(.80)	(1.34)
Constant	3.91**	4.65	-.99	-10.76	10.00	-7.23
	(1.45)	(8.10)	(.84)	(9.72)	(5.17)	(6.86)
R^2	.58	.53	.58	.66	.30	.72
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S2. Analyses of Electoral risk (*t*) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.07	-.07	-.24*	-.05	-.96**	.08
	(.14)	(.08)	(.11)	(.04)	(.33)	(.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.08*	.23	.08*	.24**	-.51**	.20
	(.03)	(.18)	(.03)	(.01)	(17)	(.26)
LPR_t	2.92	44.63	4.20	38.62	-27.00**	-10.37
	(3.54)	(50.33)	(5.09)	(24.92)	(9.59)	(22.24)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	**-.32***	**-.66**	**-.20**	**-.66**	**2.33****	**-.27**
	(.16)	**(.83)**	**(.14)**	**(.40)**	**(.78)**	**(1.24)**
$PARTY_t$	.36	-.73	.03	.29	-2.71*	-7.50**
	(.58)	(1.51)	(.30)	(1.72)	(1.13)	(2.44)
Constant	0.19	-8.88	.06	-8.54	25.86**	4.31
	(2.68)	(12.05)	(1.17)	(5.69)	(8.90)	(10.36)
R^2	.55	.56	.56	.69	.41	.69
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S3. Analyses of Government Popularity (*t*) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.44**	-.08	-.03	-.05	-.35	.03
	(.11)	(.09)	(.12)	(.03)	(.24)	(.08)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.04	-.07	.00	-.07	.21**	-.04
	(.04)	(.26)	(.02)	(.07)	(.08)	(.23)
POP_t	.04	-.39	.00	-.26**	.16**	-.26*
	(.02)	(.40)	(.04)	(.10)	(.06)	(.13)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	**-.00**	**.01**	**.00**	**.01****	**-.01***	**.00**
	(.00)	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
$PARTY_t$	-2.09**	.30	-.55	-.62	-2.43*	-.36
	(.57)	(1.71)	(.42)	(1.26)	(1.00)	(2.49)
Constant	5.81**	11.75	-0.08	7.97*	3.14	7.53
	(1.65)	(13.25)	(1.75)	(3.51)	(5.11)	(5.16)
R^2	.58	.64	.75	.75	.46	.79
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S4. Analyses of Government Popularity (t – 1) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.61**	-.26**	-.03	-.08	-.71**	.42**
	(.13)	(.06)	(.12)	(.07)	(.18)	(.14)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.07	-.32*	-.07**	-.05	.08	1.31**
	(.04)	(.16)	(.03)	(.16)	(.07)	(.27)
POP_{t-1}	.08*	.84**	-.10**	-.19	.14	-.68**
	(.04)	(.26)	(.04)	(.19)	(.04)	(.16)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	**.00**	**.01****	**.00****	**.01**	**-.00**	**-.04****
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
$PARTY_t$	-2.34**	-.28	-.85	-1.23	-3.69**	-8.69*
	(.65)	(1.22)	(.50)	(1.52)	(.88)	(3.49)
Constant	6.75**	34.33**	3.76**	8.16	11.93**	-4.07
	(1.94)	(10.00)	(1.49)	(8.61)	(3.49)	(9.04)
R^2	.64	.76	.60	.54	.59	.83
N	15	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S5. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (*t*) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.45**	-.11	-.01	-.03	-.48*	-.05
	(.12)	(.07)	(.13)	(.04)	(.23)	(.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.01*	.09**	.03**	.10**	-.01	.01
	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.05)
GPV_t	.03	-.25	-.01	-.11*	.10**	-.19**
	(.01)	(.16)	(.02)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	**-.00**	**.00**	**.00**	**.00**	**-.00****	**.00**
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	-2.15**	1.57	-.43	.73	-3.07**	2.82
	(.64)	(1.49)	(.44)	(1.58)	(1.04)	(2.48)
Constant	7.49**	-0.11	-0.54	-2.48	12.05*	0.90
	(1.87)	(3.90)	(0.98)	(1.78)	(4.93)	(5.09)
R^2	.55	.68	.53	.72	.53	.85
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S6. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.58**	-.23**	.01	-.04	-.76**	.12
	(.12)	(.08)	(.14)	(.05)	(.20)	(.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.02**	.18**	.03**	.09**	-.01	-.04
	(.01)	(.04)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.04)
GPV_{t-1}	.05**	-.20	-.06**	-.03	.07**	-.44**
	(.02)	(.14)	(.02)	(.06)	(.02)	(.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	**.00****	**.00**	**.00****	**-.00**	**-.00**	**-.02****
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	-2.41**	.35	-.90	.15	-3.46**	-.26
	(.63)	(1.82)	(.53)	(2.06)	(.99)	(3.08)
Constant	9.44**	3.29	-0.07	-0.85	17.63**	-11.61
	(1.87)	(3.93)	(0.93)	(1.94)	(4.32)	(6.72)
R^2	.65	.69	.58	.54	.50	.89
N	15	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S7. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (*t*) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.43**	-.08	-.07	-.03	-.49*	-.03
	(.12)	(.07)	(.13)	(.04)	(.23)	(.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.02	-.03	.02	.06	.09**	-.05
	(.01)	(.09)	(.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.12)
FPV_t	.02	-.37	-.01	-.13	.12**	-.18
	(.02)	(.21)	(.02)	(.09)	(.05)	(.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	**-.00**	**.00**	**.00**	**.00**	**-.00****	**.00**
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	-1.97*	2.20	.24	.45	-3.72**	1.99
	(.84)	(2.13)	(.53)	(2.21)	(1.40)	(3.98)
Constant	6.54**	6.95	.20	0.53	9.90*	4.45
	(1.80)	(4.49)	(1.24)	(1.92)	(4.75)	(5.94)
R^2	.48	.63	.44	.69	.49	.74
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S8. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.56**	-.21**	-.06	-.05	-.72**	.23*
	(.11)	(.07)	(.13)	(.05)	(.19)	(.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.02	.07	-.00	.10*	.03	.42**
	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.04)	(.03)	(.08)
FPV_{t-1}	.06*	-.33*	-.04*	-.09	.11**	-.55**
	(.03)	(.16)	(.02)	(.08)	(.04)	(.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	**.00***	**.00**	**.00****	**-.00**	**-.00**	**-.02****
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	-2.62**	.72	-.95	2.24	-4.86**	.97
	(.85)	(2.18)	(.62)	(2.66)	(1.38)	(3.39)
Constant	7.92**	8.87*	1.48	-0.50	15.49**	-8.59
	(1.67)	(4.37)	(1.02)	(2.43)	(3.92)	(6.04)
R^2	.61	.71	.59	.59	.54	.89
N	15	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S9. Analyses of Government Potential Uncertainty (*t*) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.54**	-.09	-.10	-.03	-.31	.09
	(.09)	(.05)	(.11)	(.04)	(.24)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.00	.05	.01	.10**	-.01	.16**
	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.06)
GPU_t	-.25	-7.93**	-1.28*	.01	-.60	-2.25
	(.25)	(3.10)	(.63)	(2.12)	(.79)	(1.47)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times GPU_t$	**.02****	**.12***	**.03***	**-.01**	**.03**	**-.19***
	(.01)	**(.05)**	**(.01)**	**(.03)**	**(.03)**	**(.09)**
$PARTY_t$	-.85**	-.80	.21	-1.14	-.30	-7.38**
	(.29)	(.76)	(.25)	(.93)	(.84)	(1.45)
Constant	7.49**	4.57	.53	-.07	6.27	.66
	(1.25)	(2.98)	(1.01)	(1.91)	(5.14)	(4.09)
R^2	.52	.65	.49	.66	.20	.71
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S10. Analyses of Government Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.70**	-.08	-.12	-.06	-.47*	.03
	(.10)	(.06)	(.13)	(.04)	(.19)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.00	.13**	.02*	.10**	-.04*	.09
	(.00)	(.04)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(07)
GPU_{t-1}	-.43*	-1.35	-.67	-2.92	-2.45**	-1.54
	(.21)	(3.94)	(.76)	(2.64)	(.65)	(1.52)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times GPU_{t-1}$	**.03****	**.02**	**.01**	**.02**	**.07****	**-.11**
	(.01)	**(.06)**	**(.02)**	**(.04)**	**(.02)**	**(.11)**
$PARTY_t$	-1.09**	-2.34**	.43	-.28	.29	-5.67**
	(.26)	(.91)	(.27)	(.94)	(.61)	(1.50)
Constant	9.72**	0.27	0.11	1.46	9.96*	4.15
	(1.30)	(3.27)	(1.19)	(1.81)	(3.99)	(4.17)
R^2	.73	.60	.45	.60	.59	.68
N	15	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S11. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (*t*) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.38**	.00	-.18	-.02	-.26	.06
	(.08)	(.08)	(.14)	(.04)	(.24)	(.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.01**	.11**	.03**	.10**	.01	.11**
	(.00)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.04)
FPU_t	.15	18.19	2.04	-1.70	-1.70	-3.95
	(.55)	(10.65)	(2.61)	(4.65)	(1.15)	(3.17)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	**-.03**	**-.40**	**-.03**	**.02**	**.21**	**-.01**
	(.04)	**(.21)**	**(.05)**	**(.12)**	**(.12)**	**(.18)**
$PARTY_t$	-.77**	-3.42**	.72*	-2.03**	-.52	-8.22**
	(.30)	(.72)	(.29)	(.78)	(.74)	(1.40)
Constant	5.28**	-2.66	-.06	-.42	5.25	3.83
	(1.12)	(3.84)	(1.12)	(1.81)	(5.13)	(5.20)
R^2	.52	.72	.51	.66	.32	.78
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S12. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.52**	-.20**	-.03	-.06	-.37	-.32**
	(.12)	(.07)	(.17)	(.05)	(.21)	(.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.02**	.18**	.01	.11**	.01	.07
	(.00)	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)
FPU_{t-1}	-.01	1.55	.91	3.80	.68	133.55
	(.75)	(7.66)	(1.97)	(11.17)	(19.23)	(76.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	**-.04**	**-.06**	**-.01**	**-.11**	**-.05**	**16.15**
	(.09)	**(.15)**	**(.03)**	**(.24)**	**(1.61)**	**(8.68)**
$PARTY_t$	-1.26**	-2.84**	.24	-2.16*	-.29	-4.98**
	(.35)	(.68)	(.29)	(.95)	(.66)	(.84)
Constant	7.27**	4.20	-.40	1.27	7.02	34.40**
	(1.62)	(3.48)	(1.32)	(2.08)	(4.38)	(5.42)
R^2	.49	.68	.43	.57	.40	.90
N	15	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S13. Analyses of Election Year in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.46**	-.04	-.19	-.01	-.80**	.16*
	(.09)	(.07)	(.11)	(.04)	(.21)	(.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.01	.11**	.02**	.10**	-.04**	.14*
	(.00)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.06)
$ELECYEAR_t$	-.01	-4.21	.63	-.53	-2.22**	-.56
	(.24)	(4.07)	(.61)	(1.89)	(.56)	(1.61)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECYEAR_t$	**.01**	**.06**	**-.01**	**-.01**	**.08****	**.03**
	(.01)	**(.07)**	**(.01)**	**(.03)**	**(.02)**	**(.11)**
$PARTY_t$	-1.07**	-2.49**	.42	-1.80*	-1.55**	-8.04**
	(.28)	(.71)	(.24)	(.72)	(.56)	(1.45)
Constant	6.45**	-1.39	.55	-1.47	17.25**	-4.48
	(1.27)	(3.71)	(.63)	(1.72)	(4.54)	(4.73)
R^2	.46	.58	.47	.64	.43	.68
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S14. Analyses of Electoral Proximity in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.53**	.01	-.29	-.02	-.54**	.05
	(.11)	(.08)	(.18)	(.04)	(.15)	(.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.02**	.15**	.03*	.11**	.04**	.07
	(.01)	(.05)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.09)
$ELECPROX_t$	.04	2.25*	-.03	.45	.94**	-.20
	(.09)	(1.14)	(.27)	(.67)	(.14)	(.72)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECPROX_t$	**-.01**	**-.03**	**-.00**	**-.01**	**-.04****	**.00**
	(.00)	**(.02)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.04)**
$PARTY_t$	-1.21**	-2.32**	.68*	-1.72*	-.81*	-6.53**
	(.30)	(.71)	(.32)	(.73)	(.40)	(1.54)
Constant	7.38**	-6.97	.91	-1.43	9.63**	3.30
	(1.56)	(4.91)	(1.21)	(2.26)	(3.07)	(7.14)
R^2	.51	.54	.39	.64	.72	.67
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S15. Analyses of Vote Margin (t – 1) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.72**	.14	.13	-.32*	-.29
	(.22)	(.12)	(.12)	(.16)	(.24)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.10	-.14	-.12	.18	.06
	(.07)	(.17)	(.19)	(.13)	(.12)
$MARGIN_{t-1}$	.72*	-.86	-.96	.84	.43
	(.34)	(.91)	(1.01)	(.68)	(.66)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARGIN_{t-1}$	**.02***	**.01**	**.01**	**-.01**	**-.01**
	(.01)	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-25.01*	3.98	4.65	-2.14	1.23
	(6.88)	(8.90)	(9.81)	(5.78)	(7.47)
R^2	.51	.27	.43	.13	.07
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S16. Analyses of Electoral Risk (*t*) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.76**	.03	.17	-.45*	-.25
	(.19)	(.10)	(.11)	(.18)	(.25)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.25**	.04	.08	-.02	-.11
	(.08)	(.06)	(.05)	(.04)	(.10)
LPR_t	-12.63*	-.72	17.65	-21.23	-8.90
	(5.59)	(15.06)	(15.07)	(17.72)	(10.94)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times LPR_t$	**-.38****	**-.01**	**-.26**	**.32**	**.18**
	(.15)	**(.22)**	**(.22)**	**(.18)**	**(.22)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-14.26**	-2.54	-10.43	15.14*	8.50
	(5.34)	(5.85)	(5.64)	(6.62)	(6.39)
R^2	.48	.23	.44	.17	.01
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S17. Analyses of Government Popularity (*t*) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.17	.06	.12	-.41**	-.21
	(.15)	(.08)	(.06)	(.11)	(.22)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.06	.01	-.16	.27	.19
	(.08)	(.24)	(.17)	(.16)	(.17)
POP_t	.18**	-.03	-.32	.36	.29
	(.07)	(.45)	(.34)	(.30)	(.25)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times POP_t$	**.00**	**.00**	**.01**	**-.01**	**-.01**
	(.00)	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-10.16**	-4.49	6.34	-5.61	-5.73
	(3.89)	(16.32)	(12.65)	(10.84)	(8.80)
R^2	.63	.29	.50	.12	.05
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S18. Analyses of Government Popularity (t – 1) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.42**	-.05	-.00	-.36**	-.37
	(.14)	(.08)	(.06)	(.14)	(.23)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.36**	.03	.17	.24	.18
	(.12)	(.28)	(.23)	(.22)	(.17)
POP_{t-1}	.50**	-.04	.16	.32	.35
	(.13)	(.51)	(.45)	(.40)	(.25)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times POP_{t-1}$	**.01****	**.00**	**-.00**	**-.01**	**-.01**
	(.00)	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-26.67**	.57	-10.19	-3.99	-4.50
	(5.35)	(19.47)	(17.24)	(14.65)	(8.36)
R^2	.62	.14	.36	.24	-.04
N	14	14	14	14	14

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S19. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (*t*) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.21	.03	.11	-.47**	-.22
	(.15)	(.08)	(.07)	(.12)	(.22)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.09**	.03	.07	.00	-.13
	(.03)	(.07)	(.06)	(.05)	(.10)
GPV_t	.09**	.11	-.09	.24	.16
	(.04)	(.22)	(.18)	(.15)	(.13)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times GPV_t$	**.00**	**-.00**	**.00**	**-.00**	**-.00**
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-2.60	-1.81	-7.04	14.14**	9.31
	(4.69)	(5.95)	(4.77)	(4.94)	(6.05)
R^2	.62	.26	.45	.16	.01
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S20. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability ($t - 1$) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.47**	-.06	.00	-.32*	-.36
	(.14)	(.08)	(.06)	(.16)	(.24)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.26**	.03	.04	.01	-.15
	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.05)	(.10)
GPV_{t-1}	.23**	.05	.11	.10	.16
	(.06)	(.25)	(.23)	(.23)	(.13)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times GPV_{t-1}$	**.01****	**-.00**	**-.00**	**-.00**	**-.00**
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-4.37	.44	-2.15	9.12	11.78
	(4.40)	(5.98)	(5.36)	(6.84)	(6.59)
R^2	.59	.15	.35	.24	-.04
N	14	14	14	14	14

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S21. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (*t*) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.02 (.18)	.16 (.09)	.12 (.07)	-.31* (.13)	-.18 (.21)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.03 (.01)	.09** (.03)	.05 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.06)
FPV_t	.09** (.03)	-.45* (.26)	-.26 (.21)	.08 (.20)	.05 (.11)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times FPV_t$	**.00** **(.00)**	**.01*** **(.00)**	**.00** **(.00)**	**-.00** **(.00)**	**-.00** **(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	1.55 (4.99)	-10.73** (2.94)	-6.67** (2.24)	6.64* (2.98)	1.46 (4.26)
R^2	.65	.55	.49	.07	.22
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S22. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.13	-.00	-.04	-.35	-.23
	(.16)	(.08)	(.06)	(.10)	(.21)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.09**	.05	.06	.02	-.04
	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)
FPV_{t-1}	.24**	-.36	.16	.24	.17
	(.06)	(.28)	(.28)	(.19)	(.12)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times FPV_{t-1}$	**.01****	**.01**	**-.00**	**-.00**	**-.00**
	(.00)	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**	**(.00)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-.76	-2.72	-2.51	9.49**	4.85
	(4.64)	(3.58)	(2.73)	(2.67)	(4.32)
R^2	.68	.20	.38	.34	.17
N	14	14	14	14	14

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S23. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (*t*) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.52**	.07	.04	-.05	-.17
	(.16)	(.08)	(.06)	(.11)	(.20)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.06**	.01	.03	-.01	-.01
	(.01)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
FPU_t	10.13**	-6.29	-5.96	-4.36	6.90
	(3.40)	(4.00)	(4.19)	(3.08)	(4.24)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times FPU_t$	**.26****	**.10**	**.08**	**.06**	**-.14**
	(.09)	**(.06)**	**(.05)**	**(.04)**	**(.09)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-14.06**	-2.53	-3.17	2.85	2.30
	(4.34)	(2.48)	(2.22)	(2.16)	(3.67)
R^2	.57	.43	.46	.26	.11
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S24. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.67**	-.04	-.01	-.20	.03
	(.16)	(.08)	(.05)	(.11)	(.22)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.05**	.05	.07*	.05	-.02
	(.02)	(.05)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)
FPU_{t-1}	-.56	9.77	-7.04	5.51	-10.18**
	(1.80)	(6.56)	(6.06)	(3.60)	(3.33)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times FPU_{t-1}$	**.01**	**-.13**	**.08**	**-.07**	**.22****
	(.05)	**(.09)**	**(.08)**	**(.05)**	**(.07)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-18.12**	-1.68	-3.91	2.67	.49
	(4.46)	(2.92)	(2.44)	(2.80)	(3.73)
R^2	.41	.19	.37	.10	.21
N	14	14	14	14	14

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S25. Analyses of Election Year in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.51**	-.04	.02	-.14	-.41*
	(.17)	(.07)	(.05)	(.11)	(.20)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.06**	.07*	.06	.02	-.05
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
$ELECYEAR_t$	.44	-6.18	-5.32	1.00	8.63
	(4.31)	(6.90)	(4.59)	(4.36)	(5.85)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECYEAR_t$	**-.00**	**.10**	**.08**	**-.01**	**-.16**
	(.11)	**(.10)**	**(.06)**	**(.06)**	**(.12)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-13.82	-3.35	-4.32*	3.55	6.71
	(4.74)	(2.31)	(1.99)	(2.51)	(3.66)
R^2	.38	.37	.49	.11	.10
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S26. Analyses of Electoral Proximity in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.43*	-.00	.06	-.12	-.36
	(.18)	(.09)	(.05)	(.11)	(.22)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.06*	.14*	.11**	.02	.01
	(.03)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)	(.07)
$ELECPROX_t$	-.34	2.45	1.93	-.30	1.05
	(.59)	(2.27)	(1.54)	(1.38)	(1.38)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECPROX_t$	**-.01**	**-.04**	**-.03**	**.00**	**-.03**
	(.02)	**(.03)**	**(.02)**	**(.02)**	**(.03)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-10.89*	-8.98	-9.02**	2.91	4.01
	(5.52)	(4.79)	(3.13)	(3.34)	(4.24)
R^2	.40	.30	.56	.23	.10
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S27. Analyses of Vote Margin for Congressional Party (t – 1) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.29**	-.25**	.02	-.30*	-.23**	-.51**	.00	-.14**	.05
	(.10)	(.08)	(.04)	(.13)	(.07)	(.12)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.76	-5.71**	6.71*	5.42**	.94	1.72	-.18	.16	-2.57*
	(.49)	(1.53)	(3.29)	(1.63)	(.60)	(1.15)	(1.91)	(.14)	(1.20)
$MARG_{t-1}$	.61	7.13**	1.32	4.61**	.84	-2.37	-.57	-.16	.87
	(.35)	(1.92)	(1.47)	(1.73)	(.58)	(1.57)	(2.03)	(.11)	(1.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	**-.01**	**.11****	**-.11**	**-.09****	**-.02**	**-.03**	**.02**	**-.00**	**.06***
	(.01)	**(.03)**	**(.06)**	**(.03)**	**(.01)**	**(.02)**	**(.03)**	**(.00)**	**(.02)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	.44	.73	-5.62	-3.34	.73	-1.89*	1.45	-.29	2.98
	(.56)	(.78)	(5.58)	(2.01)	(.48)	(.95)	(1.57)	(.21)	(2.98)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.10	-.01	-1.97**	.48	.03	.07	-.17	.07	1.16**
	(.08)	(.14)	(.77)	(.36)	(.08)	(.16)	(.25)	(.04)	(.42)
Constant	-34.17*	381.81	44.84	-282.16**	-45.14	128.76	5.20	8.73	-99.31
	(17.38)	(99.87)	(52.64)	(90.56)	(30.24)	(77.74)	(107.45)	(5.08)	(53.60)
R^2	.34	.15	.65	.21	.33	.27	.60	.36	.19
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S28. Analyses of Electoral Risk (*t*) in the US

	United States								
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.31*	-.16*	.01	-.15	-.35**	-.47**	-.06	-.10*	-.08
	(.12)	(.08)	(.04)	(.12)	(.08)	(.14)	(.03)	(.04)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.08	-.11	.90**	.14	-.00	.06	.55**	.07**	.40**
	(.05)	(.15)	(.25)	(.15)	(.04)	(.17)	(.15)	(.01)	(.15)
LPR_t	-6.95	4.55	19.39	-29.81	-5.85	4.59	2.66	-3.72	36.49
	(5.93)	(27.92)	(23.15)	(46.32)	(10.40)	(24.73)	(32.93)	(2.51)	(22.17)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times LPR_t$	**.18**	**.09**	**-.74**	**.68**	**.24**	**.04**	**.41**	**-.11**	**-.44**
	(.17)	**(.41)**	**(.88)**	**(.69)**	**(.19)**	**(.37)**	**(.57)**	**(.08)**	**(.38)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	.69	-1.82	-22.56**	-3.41	-.46	-2.32	-4.21	-.34	-6.16
	(.98)	(1.32)	(7.58)	(3.59)	(.69)	(1.41)	(2.53)	(.35)	(4.37)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.14*	.02	-.54	.43	.20**	.05	.37	.02	1.20**
	(.07)	(.13)	(.65)	(.30)	(.07)	(.14)	(.21)	(.03)	(.32)
Constant	-2.09	6.85	40.68	-25.65	-4.32	8.61	-49.00**	2.55	-51.32**
	(4.90)	(13.69)	(40.62)	(18.51)	(4.13)	(14.13)	(13.86)	(1.97)	(18.74)
R^2	.29	.14	.67	.16	.36	.24	.65	.40	.36
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S29. Analyses of Government Popularity (*t*) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.44**	-.24**	.09	-.36**	.06	-.50**	-.03	-.13**	.04
	(.10)	(.08)	(.06)	(.12)	(.09)	(.13)	(.03)	(.05)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.24	-1.87	1.12	4.22**	.05	.94	.88	.11	-.59
	(.22)	(.97)	(1.38)	(1.00)	(.29)	(.61)	(1.36)	(.10)	(.76)
POP_t	.36*	-2.24	.71	2.88**	.09	-1.35	-.02	-.05	.40
	(.14)	(1.18)	(.77)	(.84)	(.27)	(.85)	(1.37)	(.07)	(.65)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	**-.01**	**.03**	**-.01**	**-.08****	**.00**	**-.02**	**-.00**	**-.00**	**.02**
	(.00)	**(.02)**	**(.03)**	**(.02)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.02)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	1.38**	.11	-8.05	-6.34**	1.24**	-2.14*	.66	-.24	1.99
	(.51)	(.79)	(6.48)	(2.27)	(.45)	(.95)	(1.62)	(.24)	(3.22)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.06	-.00	-1.46**	.49**	-.03	.10	.02	.03	.67*
	(.04)	(.10)	(.55)	(.19)	(.05)	(.11)	(.17)	(.02)	(.28)
Constant	-16.91*	135.11*	27.39	-165.87**	-7.69	75.41	-31.68	4.60	-50.10
	(7.84)	(62.02)	(45.78)	(50.75)	(13.99)	(41.57)	(74.82)	(3.67)	(44.55)
R^2	.47	.10	.62	.42	.43	.29	.59	.36	.21
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S30. Analyses of Government Popularity ($t - 1$) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.46**	-.17*	.08	.00	-.05	-.52**	-.06*	-.10	.01
	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.14)	(.07)	(.13)	(.02)	(.06)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.13	-.47	2.06	2.02	.15	.49	2.44*	.03	-.41
	(.18)	(1.22)	(1.98)	(1.34)	(.34)	(.69)	(1.06)	(.13)	(.83)
POP_{t-1}	.29*	-.53	.67	2.17	.26	-.64	1.38	-.00	.27
	(.13)	(1.48)	(.95)	(1.14)	(.32)	(.96)	(1.10)	(.09)	(.66)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times POP_{t-1}$	**-.00**	**.01**	**-.02**	**-.03**	**-.00**	**-.01**	**-.03**	**.00**	**.01**
	(.00)	**(.02)**	**(.04)**	**(.02)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.02)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	1.18**	.12	-9.96	1.64	1.72**	-2.54*	1.94	-.25	3.10
	(.43)	(.87)	(8.64)	(2.62)	(.43)	(1.10)	(1.55)	(.27)	(3.53)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.02	-.03	-1.65*	.03	-.10	.03	.17	.03	.62
	(.04)	(.13)	(.73)	(.29)	(.06)	(.15)	(.18)	(.03)	(.34)
Constant	-12.15	44.11	43.25	-156.59*	-15.80	44.94	-121.20*	1.06	-38.31
	(6.24)	(77.55)	(50.97)	(70.31)	(16.53)	(46.45)	(60.24)	(4.70)	(43.50)
R^2	.55	.13	.58	.23	.55	.27	.63	.33	.15
N	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S31. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential Vulnerability (*t*) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.44**	-.25**	.09	-.36**	-.06	-.50**	-.03	-.13**	.04
	(.10)	(.08)	(.06)	(.12)	(.09)	(.13)	(.03)	(.05)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.04	-.28**	.77**	.30	.09**	.07	.68**	.06**	.20
	(.04)	(.10)	(.16)	(.19)	(.04)	(.08)	(.20)	(.02)	(.15)
GPV_t	.18	-1.12	.36	1.44**	.05	-.68	-.01	-.03	.20
	(.07)	(.59)	(.39)	(.42)	(.13)	(.43)	(.68)	(.04)	(.33)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	**-.00**	**.02**	**-.00**	**-.04****	**.00**	**-.01**	**-.00**	**-.00**	**.01**
	(.00)	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	1.38**	.11	-8.05	-6.34**	1.24**	-2.14*	.66	-.24	1.99
	(.51)	(.79)	(6.48)	(2.27)	(.45)	(.95)	(1.62)	(.24)	(3.22)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.06	-.00	-1.46**	.49**	-.03	.10	.02	.03	.67*
	(.04)	(.10)	(.55)	(.19)	(.05)	(.11)	(.17)	(.02)	(.28)
Constant	.96	23.26**	63.12*	-21.83	-3.09	7.87	-32.73**	2.05	-30.25
	(2.70)	(7.31)	(29.06)	(16.39)	(3.19)	(6.14)	(11.74)	(1.33)	(19.14)
R^2	.47	.10	.62	.42	.43	.29	.60	.36	.21
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S32. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.46**	-.17*	.08	.00	-.05	-.52**	-.06*	-.09	.01
	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.14)	(.07)	(.13)	(.02)	(.06)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.01	-.19	.94**	.73**	.14**	.08	.90**	.04	.22
	(.03)	(.12)	(.23)	(.24)	(.04)	(.09)	(.17)	(.03)	(.16)
GPV_{t-1}	.15*	-.27	.33	1.09	.13	-.32	.69	-.00	.14
	(.06)	(.74)	(.47)	(.57)	(.16)	(.48)	(.55)	(.05)	(.33)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times GPV_{t-1}$	**-.00**	**.00**	**-.01**	**-.01**	**-.00**	**-.00**	**-.02**	**.00**	**.01**
	(.00)	**(.01)**	**(.02)**	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**	**(.01)**	**(.00)**	**(.01)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	1.18**	.12	-9.96	1.64	1.72**	-2.54*	1.94	-.25	3.10
	(.43)	(.87)	(8.64)	(2.62)	(.43)	(1.10)	(1.55)	(.27)	(3.53)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.02	-.03	-1.65*	.03	-.10	.03	.17	.03	.62
	(.04)	(.13)	(.73)	(.29)	(.06)	(.15)	(.18)	(.03)	(.34)
Constant	2.50	17.61*	76.60*	-48.04*	-2.96	12.97	-51.95**	1.05	-24.80
	(2.36)	(8.24)	(38.56)	(19.75)	(2.96)	(7.94)	(11.67)	(1.76)	(20.77)
R^2	.55	.13	.58	.23	.55	.27	.63	.33	.15
N	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S33. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential Uncertainty (*t*) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.30**	-.14*	.05	-.05	-.20**	-.61**	.01	-.06	.02
	(.10)	(.06)	(.04)	(.09)	(.07)	(.13)	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.01	-.23**	.67**	.21	.05*	.22*	.36**	.05**	.34*
	(.03)	(.08)	(.11)	(.11)	(.02)	(.10)	(.10)	(.01)	(.13)
GPU_t	6.67*	-18.72**	7.96	-169.68**	-4.87	-11.11	-20.76	-1.46	-1.01
	(2.87)	(6.52)	(6.46)	(48.11)	(6.66)	(9.26)	(12.08)	(1.13)	(6.51)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times GPU_t$	**-.17***	**.33****	**.51**	**2.62****	**.11**	**-.15**	**.37***	**-.04**	**-.16**
	(.07)	**(.11)**	**(.33)**	**(.73)**	**(.12)**	**(.14)**	**(.18)**	**(.03)**	**(.19)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	1.29*	-.49	-11.80*	-.53	.40	-1.84	-1.08	-.23	1.58
	(.56)	(.83)	(5.51)	(2.01)	(.52)	(.98)	(1.53)	(.22)	(3.31)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.18**	-.19*	-.77	.29	.08*	.00	.07	.01	.61*
	(.04)	(.08)	(.43)	(.18)	(.04)	(.09)	(.13)	(.02)	(.26)
Constant	-6.72**	27.42**	41.64	-24.83	-2.91	24.61**	-21.41*	2.01	-22.28
	(2.62)	(7.94)	(31.81)	(14.02)	(3.41)	(7.92)	(8.72)	(1.29)	(16.89)
R^2	.33	.04	.65	.28	.36	.25	.66	.42	.24
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S34. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.21**	-.13*	-.01	-.10	-.27**	-.53**	-.03	-.09*	.03
	(.07)	(.06)	(.04)	(.09)	(.06)	(.14)	(.01)	(.04)	(.05)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.02	.00	.59**	.30**	.05*	.17	.61**	.06**	.41**
	(.02)	(.10)	(.13)	(.10)	(.02)	(.12)	(.09)	(.01)	(.15)
GPU_{t-1}	1.12	15.69*	5.87	-122.88	-21.49*	-3.47	-31.77*	-1.15	-8.78
	(2.06)	(7.62)	(7.13)	(75.44)	(9.72)	(11.06)	(12.66)	(1.37)	(7.45)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	**-.01**	**-.20**	**1.05***	**1.87**	**.44***	**-.04**	**.57****	**-.05**	**-.27**
	(.05)	**(.13)**	**(.49)**	**(1.13)**	**(.18)**	**(.17)**	**(.19)**	**(.04)**	**(.21)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	.17	-.49	-11.25	.85	.43	-2.27	1.62	-.45	4.48
	(.51)	(.83)	(7.46)	(2.37)	(.45)	(1.20)	(1.53)	(.28)	(3.69)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.13**	-.02	-1.23*	.27	.15**	-.03	.15	.04	.60
	(.04)	(.08)	(.52)	(.22)	(.04)	(.11)	(.13)	(.03)	(.31)
Constant	-6.38**	3.11	86.62*	-26.43	-5.13	21.98*	-38.83**	1.03	-20.63
	(2.13)	(8.72)	(36.96)	(15.61)	(2.86)	(9.48)	(8.65)	(1.59)	(19.11)
R^2	.42	.40	.62	.17	.60	.25	.71	.35	.16
N	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S35. Analyses of Election Year in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.32**	-.09	.04	.02	-.16**	-.42**	-.01	-.07*	.05
	(.09)	(.05)	(.04)	(.10)	(.06)	(.13)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.07*	-.02	.71**	.26*	.07**	.06	.59**	.06**	.37**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.11)	(.11)	(.02)	(.08)	(.11)	(.01)	(.13)
$ELECYEAR_t$	-4.14*	20.40**	3.61	8.94	2.59	9.20	-4.06	-.74	-9.17
	(1.67)	(5.93)	(4.92)	(10.52)	(2.30)	(8.44)	(9.30)	(.54)	(6.10)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times ELECYEAR_t$	**.12****	**-.31****	**-.01**	**-.22**	**-.04**	**.15**	**.09**	**-.03***	**-.31**
	(.05)	**(.10)**	**(.23)**	**(.18)**	**(.04)**	**(.13)**	**(.15)**	**(.02)**	**(.20)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	.89*	.26	-13.70**	-.93	.73	-1.88*	1.04	-.24	2.41
	(.45)	(.62)	(4.67)	(1.75)	(.47)	(.91)	(1.48)	(.20)	(2.99)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.16**	-.14*	-1.08**	.18	.05	.02	-.07	.03	.72**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.37)	(.19)	(.04)	(.09)	(.14)	(.02)	(.27)
Constant	-3.36	10.81	63.07*	-23.02	-3.14	10.48	-25.90**	1.51	-29.55
	(2.32)	(5.81)	(27.74)	(14.76)	(3.31)	(5.70)	(9.81)	(1.13)	(16.76)
R^2	.27	.35	.63	.23	.30	.23	.60	.43	.26
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S36. Analyses of Electoral Proximity in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.26**	-.06	.03	-.05	-.16**	-.43**	.00	-.08**	.05
	(.09)	(.05)	(.04)	(.10)	(.06)	(.13)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.00	-.26**	1.08**	.22	.03	.17	.76**	.04**	.14
	(.04)	(.07)	(.17)	(.16)	(.03)	(.10)	(.15)	(.01)	(.17)
$ELECPROX_t$	.77	-9.27**	-2.21	-1.64	-1.41	-2.09	5.30	.20	2.93
	(.66)	(2.21)	(1.77)	(4.42)	(.91)	(3.15)	(3.50)	(.19)	(2.23)
$PREFS_{t-1} \times ELECPROX_t$	**-.02**	**.14****	**-.18***	**.04**	**.02**	**-.03**	**-.10**	**.01**	**.09**
	(.02)	**(.04)**	**(.07)**	**(.07)**	**(.02)**	**(.05)**	**(.06)**	**(.01)**	**(.07)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	.78	.23	-14.53**	-.86	.76	-1.90*	.97	-.25	2.08
	(.45)	(.62)	(4.41)	(1.86)	(.46)	(.91)	(1.39)	(.20)	(3.07)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.14**	-.13*	-1.08**	.21	.05	.03	-.01	.03	.69**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.35)	(.20)	(.04)	(.09)	(.13)	(.02)	(.26)
Constant	-5.40*	25.82**	71.11**	-21.15	-.59	17.09*	-39.20**	1.30	-34.65*
	(2.40)	(6.29)	(26.25)	(16.83)	(3.52)	(6.89)	(10.72)	(1.20)	(17.39)
R^2	.32	.38	.68	.13	.31	.23	.67	.39	.23
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S37. SUR Models of Policy Representation in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.39**	-.05	-.10	-.02	-.17	.08
	(.09)	(.07)	(.13)	(.04)	(.24)	(.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	**.01****	**.11****	**.02****	**.10****	**.01**	**.10***
	(.00)	**(.03)**	**(.01)**	**(.02)**	**(.01)**	**(.05)**
$PARTY_t$	-.97**	-2.29**	.37	-1.69*	-.27	-6.87**
	(.28)	(.72)	(.27)	(.71)	(.65)	(1.31)
Constant	5.52**	-0.88	-0.22	-0.81	3.27	1.09
	(1.27)	(3.58)	(1.02)	(1.72)	(5.12)	(4.37)
R^2	.45	.52	.35	.64	.17	.68
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in Canada based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S38. SUR Models of Policy Representation in Canada (Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted)

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	**.01****	**.12****	**.02****	**.10****	**.02**	**.11****
	(.01)	**(.03)**	**(.01)**	**(.02)**	**(.01)**	**(.04)**
$PARTY_t$	-.34	-2.70**	.22	-1.85**	.02	-5.94**
	(.28)	(.66)	(.20)	(.67)	(.49)	(1.02)
Constant	0.18	-3.90*	1.00*	-1.66*	-0.40	7.12**
	(0.24)	(1.62)	(0.43)	(0.78)	(0.41)	(1.00)
R^2	.18	.48	.29	.65	.11	.69
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in Canada based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S39. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	.50**	-.05	.02	-.16	-.35
	(.17)	(.07)	(.05)	(.11)	(.22)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	**.05****	**.08***	**.07***	**.02**	**-.04**
	(.02)	**(.03)**	**(.03)**	**(.03)**	**(.04)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	-13.44**	-3.70	-4.57	3.76	5.90
	(4.76)	(2.42)	(2.00)	(2.40)	(4.01)
R^2	.35	.26	.36	.10	.03
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the UK based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S40. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the UK (Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted)

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	**.02**	**.08****	**.07****	**-.01**	**.02**
	(.01)	**(.03)**	**(.03)**	**(.02)**	**(.03)**
$PARTY_t$	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	0.42	-5.21*	-4.25*	1.09	-0.93
	(0.47)	(2.13)	(2.00)	(1.61)	(1.30)
R^2	.13	.21	.34	.02	.02
N	15	15	15	15	15

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the UK based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S41. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_{t-1}$	-.30**	-.08	.04	-.05	-.18**	-.47**	-.01	-.09**	.05
	(.09)	(.06)	(.04)	(.10)	(.06)	(.13)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	**-.04**	**-.09**	**.72****	**.28***	**.07****	**.12**	**.62****	**.06****	**.31***
	(.03)	**(.07)**	**(.10)**	**(.12)**	**(.02)**	**(.08)**	**(.12)**	**(.01)**	**(.13)**
PARTY $PRES_t$	.86	.23	-13.85**	-.87	.83	-1.99*	.97	-.24	2.93
	(.46)	(.75)	(4.68)	(1.88)	(.47)	(.91)	(1.52)	(.21)	(3.07)
PARTY $HOUSE_t$	.15**	-.13	-1.08**	.23	.05	.03	-.04	.02	.64*
	(.04)	(.08)	(.37)	(.20)	(.04)	(.09)	(.15)	(.02)	(.27)
Constant	-4.22	14.95*	64.20*	-24.65	-2.56	14.39**	-29.14**	1.68	-26.93
	(2.31)	(6.90)	(27.78)	(15.86)	(3.39)	(5.06)	(9.90)	(1.16)	(16.86)
R^2	.28	.09	.63	.11	.28	.23	.59	.38	.21
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the US based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S42. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the US (Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted)

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	**.04**	**-.03**	**.77****	**.26***	**.07****	**.04**	**.60****	**.06****	**.32***
	(.02)	**(.05)**	**(.09)**	**(.11)**	**(.02)**	**(.09)**	**(.07)**	**(.01)**	**(.13)**
PARTY	.27	.11	-16.47**	-.91	.41	-.72	.82	-.28	3.71
$PRES_t$	(.45)	(.75)	(4.27)	(1.88)	(.49)	(.97)	(1.37)	(.21)	(2.98)
PARTY	.09*	-.08	-1.21**	.25	.08	-.03	-.01	.04*	.40
$HOUSE_t$	(.04)	(.07)	(.35)	(.20)	(.04)	(.10)	(.12)	(.02)	(.21)
Constant	-6.52**	6.75	84.79**	-26.77	-7.54**	4.66	-30.56**	-0.12	-9.17
	(2.36)	(3.96)	(19.50)	(15.25)	(2.68)	(5.19)	(8.93)	(0.97)	(10.53)
R^2	.19	.07	.64	.10	.22	.03	.60	.36	.17
N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the US based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S43. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in Canada

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.69**	.70**	.79**	.74**	.81**	.73**
	(.12)	(.12)	(.10)	(.13)	(.09)	(.13)
$POLICY_t$	**-5.77****	**-.05**	**-3.22**	**.27**	**-3.09****	**.00**
	(2.03)	**(.25)**	**(1.76)**	**(.24)**	**(.89)**	**(.14)**
Constant	72.79**	13.47	38.47*	-0.24	64.56**	-3.11
	(25.89)	(11.65)	(17.87)	(11.16)	(17.65)	(11.54)
R^2	.70	.80	.74	.84	.88	.66
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in Canada with coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *PREFS* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S44. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in Canada (Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted)

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_t$	**-4.52*** **(2.01)**	**1.34**** **(.19)**	**-9.00**** **(1.40)**	**1.41**** **(.17)**	**-5.57**** **(.73)**	**.02** **(.13)**
Constant	54.46* (25.95)	-21.01 (11.23)	127.32** (12.60)	-30.99** (10.70)	124.04** (14.50)	-13.69 (11.50)
R^2	.10	.39	.20	.55	.31	-.01
N	16	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in Canada with coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *PREFS* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S45. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the UK

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.47**	.53**	.84**	.86**	.64**
	(.13)	(.15)	(.07)	(.12)	(.15)
$POLICY_t$	**-4.92****	**.16**	**-.13**	**-.24**	**-3.02****
	(1.24)	**(.36)**	**(.12)**	**(.49)**	**(.85)**
Constant	129.23**	28.84	17.97**	18.83	49.59**
	(34.92)	(10.72)	(4.37)	(9.95)	(14.52)
R^2	.69	.59	.92	.86	.80
N	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the UK with coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *PREFS* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S46. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the UK (Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted)

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$POLICY_t$	**-5.96****	**.67***	**.29**	**1.38****	**-5.03****
	(1.34)	**(.34)**	**(.22)**	**(.50)**	**(1.01)**
Constant	147.25**	48.44**	67.19**	31.85*	102.34**
	(39.38)	(12.01)	(8.36)	(15.42)	(11.47)
R^2	.49	.31	.21	.43	.58
N	16	16	16	16	16

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the UK with coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *PREFS* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S47. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the US

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	.72** (.07)	.59** (.11)	.74** (.07)	.94** (.04)	.88** (.07)	.97** (.09)	.91** (.09)	.91** (.06)	.83** (.09)
$POLICY_t$	**-.60** (.20)**	**-.18** (.07)**	**-.07** (.02)**	**-.05 (.03)**	**-.41* (.20)**	**.11 (.17)**	**.00 (.01)**	**-.53* (.24)**	**.02 (.03)**
Constant	15.79** (4.12)	28.40** (8.00)	21.50** (6.94)	6.18** (1.99)	15.68* (6.30)	-3.15 (6.94)	5.55 (4.97)	4.11 (4.03)	-6.15 (4.33)
R^2	.72	.78	.74	.93	.71	.70	.85	.82	.63
N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the US with coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *PREFS* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S48. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the US (Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted)

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$POLICY_t$	**-1.56** (.20)**	**-.42** (.05)**	**-.11** (.03)**	**.31** (.07)**	**-.45 (.26)**	**.11 (.24)**	**.08** (.01)**	**.61 (.42)**	**.08* (.03)**
Constant	50.90** (2.19)	69.17** (1.05)	25.61** (9.52)	44.24** (3.30)	63.28** (6.13)	-66.63** (3.87)	53.71** (1.28)	-39.65** (5.03)	-37.18** (4.17)
R^2	.54	.61	.11	.31	.04	.02	.55	.06	.12
N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the US with coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *PREFS* (*t*). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper.

Table S49. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in Canada: Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.00** (.00)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.02 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.36** (.14)	-.38 (.79)	-.10 (.13)	-.51 (.34)	-.83 (.66)	-.94 (.73)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00* (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.00* (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.02** (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.01** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00* (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.01** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	.00 (.01)	.13* (.06)	.02 (.01)	.00 (.03)	.02 (.03)	-.04 (.08)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	.00 (.01)	.01 (.06)	.01 (.02)	.04 (.04)	.06** (.02)	.03 (.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	-.04 (.04)	-.40* (.18)	.01 (.04)	.04 (.11)	.21 (.13)	-.13 (.15)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	-.02 (.13)	-.07 (.18)	-.01 (.03)	-.12 (.24)	-.43 (1.67)	9.97 (13.03)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECYEAR_t$	-.00 (.01)	.05 (.06)	-.02 (.01)	-.01 (.03)	.04 (.02)	-.02 (.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECPROX_t$	.00 (.00)	-.04* (.02)	-.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)	-.03** (.01)	.00 (.04)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while omitting the lagged dependent variable (footnote 12 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S50. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the UK: Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.12 (.18)	.02 (.18)	-.04 (.15)	-.06 (.12)	.24 (.23)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.01* (.00)	.01 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	.16 (.12)	.08 (.05)	.07 (.05)	.09* (.04)	-.14 (.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	-.04 (.06)	-.11 (.09)	.11 (.08)	-.04 (.05)	.19** (.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECYEAR_t$	-.00 (.13)	.08 (.09)	.06 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.17 (.12)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECPROX_t$	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.02)	.00 (.02)	-.01 (.03)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while omitting the lagged dependent variable (footnote 12 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S51. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the US: Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.01 (.01)	.06* (.02)	-.09 (.06)	-.05 (.03)	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.03)	-.00 (.02)	-.01* (.00)	.04 (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	.22 (.17)	.12 (.37)	-.97 (.87)	.61 (.70)	.14 (.21)	.35 (.38)	.18 (.46)	-.02 (.07)	-.47 (.39)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.01 (.00)	.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.03* (.02)	.00 (.00)	-.02 (.01)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.03)	-.02 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.02* (.01)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	-.16* (.08)	.20* (.10)	.41 (.32)	2.79** (.74)	.08 (.14)	.13 (.16)	.45* (.19)	-.02 (.03)	-.13 (.19)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	-.01 (.06)	-.29* (.13)	1.04* (.49)	1.45 (1.09)	.20 (.24)	.22 (.18)	.54** (.20)	-.03 (.04)	-.18 (.21)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × ELEC $YEAR_t$	.10 (.05)	-.33** (.10)	.11 (.23)	-.22 (.18)	-.08 (.05)	.17 (.15)	.11 (.15)	-.04* (.02)	-.22 (.20)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × ELEC $PROX_t$	-.02 (.02)	.15** (.04)	-.20** (.07)	.04 (.08)	.04 (.02)	-.05 (.05)	-.09 (.06)	.01* (.01)	.08 (.07)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while omitting the lagged dependent variable (footnote 12 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S52. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for Election Year

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01** (.00)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.02 (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.26 (.17)	-.50 (.85)	-.26 (.10)	-.63 (.42)	2.21** (.79)	-.27 (1.29)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)	-.01** (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	.01** (.00)	.00** (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.04** (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.01** (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.02** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00** (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.02** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	.02** (.01)	.10* (.05)	.03** (.01)	-.02 (.03)	.02 (.03)	-.26** (.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	.03** (.01)	.02 (.06)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.03)	.10** (.02)	-.14 (.11)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	-.05 (.04)	-.43 (.23)	-.01 (.05)	.07 (.13)	.18 (.13)	.00 (.19)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	-.04 (.09)	-.06 (.14)	-.01 (.03)	.12 (.24)	.12 (1.57)	16.21 (8.70)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn and controlling for the variable Election Year (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S53. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for Election Year

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	.02* (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.39** (.14)	.01 (.21)	-.16 (.23)	.63* (.25)	.08 (.24)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.00)	-.01 (.00)	-.01 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.01** (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.01** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.01** (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	.25** (.10)	.09 (.05)	.06 (.05)	.07 (.04)	-.14 (.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	.02 (.04)	-.13 (.09)	.06 (.07)	-.07 (.05)	.21** (.07)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn and controlling for the variable Election Year (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S54. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for Election Year

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.01 (.01)	.10** (.03)	-.10 (.06)	-.09** (.03)	-.02 (.01)	-.03 (.02)	.02 (.03)	-.00 (.00)	.06* (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	.19 (.17)	.09 (.41)	-.87 (.89)	.27 (.66)	.23 (.19)	.04 (.37)	.45 (.56)	-.11 (.08)	-.47 (.38)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.01 (.00)	.03 (.02)	-.00 (.03)	-.07** (.02)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.00 (.00)	.02 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.02)	-.02 (.04)	-.01 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.03 (.02)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.04** (.01)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	-.18* (.07)	.31** (.10)	.58 (.32)	2.52** (.69)	.11 (.12)	-.16 (.14)	.37* (.18)	-.04 (.03)	-.17 (.19)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	-.02 (.06)	-.21 (.12)	1.09* (.49)	1.72 (1.09)	.43* (.18)	-.03 (.18)	.58** (.19)	-.05 (.04)	-.25 (.21)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn and controlling for the variable Election Year (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S55. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for Electoral Proximity

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01** (.00)	-.02 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.03* (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.37* (.18)	-.83 (.82)	-.35** (.08)	-.75 (.47)	1.22 (.66)	-.55 (1.32)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	-.00* (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	.01** (.00)	.00** (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.03** (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00* (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.02** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00* (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.02** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	.02** (.01)	.13* (.05)	.03* (.01)	-.01 (.03)	.03 (.02)	-.21* (.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	.03** (.01)	-.01 (.06)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.04)	.08** (.02)	-.14 (.11)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	-.07 (.04)	-.36 (.24)	-.03 (.05)	.05 (.15)	.05 (.14)	.08 (.20)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	-.03 (.09)	-.02 (.15)	-.02 (.03)	-.07 (.23)	.39 (1.55)	17.26* (8.68)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn and controlling for the variable Electoral Proximity (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S56. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for Electoral Proximity

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	.02*	.00	-.01	-.04**	.01
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.45**	.16	-.07	.69**	-.12
	(.14)	(.22)	(.23)	(.15)	(.30)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	.00	.00	.01	-.01	-.01
	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.01**	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01
	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	.00	-.00	.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.01**	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	.00	.01*	.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.00*	.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	.27**	.10	.04	.05	-.12
	(.09)	(.06)	(.06)	(.04)	(.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	.06	-.11	.10	-.06	.19**
	(.05)	(.09)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn and controlling for the variable Electoral Proximity (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S57. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for Electoral Proximity

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.01 (.01)	.10** (.03)	-.11 (.06)	-.09** (.03)	-.02 (.01)	-.03 (.02)	.02 (.03)	-.00 (.00)	.06** (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	.17 (.17)	.07 (.39)	-.71 (.88)	.67 (.69)	.25 (.19)	.04 (.37)	.49 (.56)	-.12 (.08)	-.51 (.39)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.00 (.00)	.03 (.02)	-.01 (.03)	-.08** (.02)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.00 (.00)	.02 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.02)	-.02 (.04)	-.03 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.03 (.02)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.04** (.01)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	-.19* (.07)	.32** (.10)	.55 (.33)	2.68** (.74)	.11 (.12)	-.16 (.14)	.38* (.17)	-.04 (.03)	-.17 (.19)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	-.01 (.05)	-.22 (.12)	1.07* (.49)	1.80 (1.22)	.44* (.18)	-.03 (.17)	.58** (.19)	-.05 (.04)	-.27 (.21)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn and controlling for the variable Electoral Proximity (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S58. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability Measures (I)

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$MARG_{t-1}$	-.01	.01	-.01	-.01	.04	.00
	(.00)	(.07)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.10)
LPR_t	-.01	.02	-.01	-.01	.04	-.01
	(.01)	(.07)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.09)
POP_t	.00	.06	-.03**	-.00	.06*	-.13
	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.10)
POP_{t-1}	.01	.01	-.02	.00	.02	.08
	(.00)	(.06)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.09)
GPV_t	.00	.04	-.02*	-.02	.06	-.16*
	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.08)
GPV_{t-1}	.01	.03	-.02	.01	.02	.08
	(.01)	(.07)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.09)
FPV_t	.00	.04	-.02	-.00	.06*	-.17
	(.02)	(.07)	(.01)	(.04)	(.03)	(.11)
FPV_{t-1}	.01	.03	-.02	.02	.02	.15
	(.01)	(.07)	(.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.08)
GPU_t	-.00	.03	-.02	-.02	.04	-.01
	(.01)	(.07)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.10)
GPU_{t-1}	-.01	.01	-.03**	.02	.05*	.09
	(.01)	(.05)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.08)
FPU_t	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.05*	-.11
	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.10)
FPU_{t-1}	-.00	.03	-.02	.01	.03	.08
	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.08)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable Election Year based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S59. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability Measures (I)

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$MARG_{t-1}$	-.01	.07	.12	.02	-.27*
	(.12)	(.10)	(.07)	(.06)	(.11)
LPR_t	-.02	.07	.12	.02	-.27*
	(.11)	(.10)	(.07)	(.06)	(.13)
POP_t	-.01	.07	.08	-.03	-.18
	(.09)	(.09)	(.06)	(.05)	(.11)
POP_{t-1}	-.18	.07	.08	-.02	-.21
	(.11)	(.10)	(.06)	(.05)	(.12)
GPV_t	-.03	.07	.07	-.03	-.19
	(.09)	(.09)	(.06)	(.05)	(.12)
GPV_{t-1}	-.18	.09	.08	-.01	-.20
	(.11)	(.10)	(.06)	(.05)	(.12)
FPV_t	-.01	.08	.08	-.02	-.13
	(.09)	(.09)	(.06)	(.06)	(.09)
FPV_{t-1}	-.18	.06	.06	-.03	-.18
	(.10)	(.10)	(.06)	(.05)	(.11)
FPU_t	-.11	-.01	.09	-.04	-.23
	(.12)	(.11)	(.06)	(.06)	(.12)
FPU_{t-1}	-.03	.11	.10	-.05	-.18
	(.10)	(.10)	(.06)	(.06)	(.13)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable Election Year based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S60. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability Measures (I)

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$MARG_{t-1}$	.12**	-.30**	.03	-.21	-.05	.13	.11	-.03*	-.28
	(.04)	(.09)	(.22)	(.18)	(.04)	(.13)	(.15)	(.01)	(.20)
LPR_t	.12*	-.35**	-.01	-.14	-.02	.16	.25	-.04*	-.20
	(.05)	(.09)	(.24)	(.19)	(04)	(.13)	(.15)	(.02)	(.19)
POP_t	.10*	-.32**	-.02	-.14	-.08	.18	.15	-.03*	-.32
	(.04)	(.09)	(.22)	(.18)	(.04)	(.12)	(.15)	(.02)	(.21)
POP_{t-1}	.07*	-.37**	-.10	-.23	.01	.16	.19	-.03*	-.22
	(.03)	(.09)	(.24)	(.16)	(.03)	(.12)	(.14)	(.02)	(.21)
GPV_t	.10*	-.32**	-.02	-.14	-.08*	.18	.15	-.03*	-.32
	(.04)	(.09)	(.22)	(.18)	(.04)	(.12)	(.15)	(.02)	(.21)
GPV_{t-1}	.07*	-.37**	-.01	-.01	-.00	-.00	-.01	.00	.01
	(.03)	(.09)	(.02)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)
GPU_t	.12**	-.32**	-.02	-.23	-.04	.15	.14	-.03*	-.35
	(.05)	(.09)	(.23)	(.19)	(.04)	(.12)	(.15)	(.02)	(.20)
GPU_{t-1}	.04	-.33**	.02	-.26	-.03	.10	.04	-.03	-.22
	(.03)	(.09)	(.24)	(.16)	(.04)	(.13)	(.12)	(.02)	(.21)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable Election Year based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S61. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability Measures (II)

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$MARG_{t-1}$	.00	-.03	.00	-.01	-.03**	-.00
	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
LPR_t	.00	-.03	.00	-.01	-.03**	-.00
	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
POP_t	.00	-.04*	.00	-.01	-.03**	.03
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)
POP_{t-1}	-.01	-.06**	.00	-.04**	-.04**	-.09*
	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)
GPV_t	-.00	-.04*	.00	-.00	-.03**	.06
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)
GPV_{t-1}	-.01	-.07**	.01	-.04**	-.04**	-.07
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
FPV_t	-.00	-.04*	.00	-.01	-.03**	.04
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
FPV_{t-1}	-.01	-.06**	.00	-.04**	-.04**	-.08**
	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)
GPU_t	.00	-.04*	.00	-.01	-.03	.00
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
GPU_{t-1}	.00	-.04*	.01**	-.03**	-.04**	-.08
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
FPU_t	.00	-.04**	.00	-.01	-.03**	.03
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
FPU_{t-1}	.00	-.05*	-.01	-.03**	-.04**	-.06
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable Electoral Proximity based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S62. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability Measures (II)

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$MARG_{t-1}$	-.00	-.00	-.07**	-.02	-.00
	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
LPR_t	-.00	-.01	-.06*	-.02	-.03
	(.02)	(.04)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
POP_t	.03*	-.03	-.03	.00	-.01
	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.01)	(.03)
POP_{t-1}	.04*	-.04	-.02	-.00	-.04
	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
GPV_t	.03*	-.03	-.03	.00	-.02
	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.01)	(.03)
GPV_{t-1}	.05**	-.05	-.03	-.00	-.05
	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
FPV_t	.01	-.03	-.03	.00	-.02
	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
FPV_{t-1}	.02	-.03	-.02	.01	-.02
	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
FPU_t	-.00	.03	-.04	.01	-.04
	(.02)	(.05)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
FPU_{t-1}	.02	-.05	-.04*	.00	-.02
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable Electoral Proximity based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S63. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability Measures (II)

	Cities	Crime	Defence	Education	Environment	Foreign Aid	Health	Space	Welfare
$MARG_{t-1}$	-.02	.14**	-.19**	.04	.02	-.04	-.11*	.01	.10
	(.02)	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)	(.02)	(.05)	(.05)	(.01)	(.07)
LPR_t	-.02	.13**	-.18*	.02	.02	-.03	-.11*	.01	.10
	(.02)	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)	(02)	(.05)	(.05)	(.01)	(.06)
POP_t	-.01	.12**	-.16*	.02	.04*	-.03	-.10	.00	.09
	(.02)	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)	(.01)	(.05)	(.06)	(.01)	(.07)
POP_{t-1}	-.01	.15**	-.17*	-.01	-.00	-.03	-.13**	.01	.06
	(.01)	(.04)	(.07)	(.07)	(.01)	(.04)	(.05)	(.01)	(.07)
GPV_t	-.01	.12**	-.16*	.02	.04*	-.03	-.10	.00	.09
	(.02)	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)	(.01)	(.05)	(.06)	(.01)	(.07)
GPV_{t-1}	-.01	.15**	-.17*	-.01	-.00	-.03	-.13**	.01	.06
	(.01)	(.04)	(.07)	(.07)	(.01)	(.04)	(.05)	(.01)	(.07)
GPU_t	-.02	.14**	-.17*	.02	.02	-.04	-.11*	.01	.11
	(.02)	(.04)	(.07)	(.08)	(.02)	(.04)	(.06)	(.01)	(.07)
GPU_{t-1}	-.00	.15**	-.20**	.07	.02	-.02	-.11*	.01	.07
	(.01)	(.04)	(.07)	(.07)	(.02)	(.05)	(.05)	(.01)	(.07)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable Electoral Proximity based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S64. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in Canada: Controlling for GDP

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.00 (.00)	-.02 (.02)	-.01** (.01)	-.03 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.61** (.23)	-1.42 (.92)	-.21 (.14)	-1.00* (.47)	2.45** (.84)	-.66 (1.16)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.01** (.00)	-.01* (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.00 (.00)	.03** (.00)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.03* (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00** (.00)	-.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.00* (.00)	.01 (.00)	.00** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.01** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01** (.00)	-.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.00** (.00)	.01** (.00)	.00** (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.01** (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	.02* (.01)	.13** (.05)	.04** (.02)	-.01 (.03)	.03 (.03)	-.14* (.07)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	.03** (.01)	.03 (.07)	-.01 (.02)	.04 (.04)	.07** (.02)	.00 (.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	-.09* (.04)	-.67 (.36)	-.03 (.06)	-.02 (.19)	.25 (.16)	.12 (.20)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	-.05 (.10)	.18 (.28)	.04 (.04)	.68* (.35)	-.88 (1.82)	25.02* (12.49)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECYEAR_t$	.01 (.01)	.10 (.07)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.03)	.09** (.02)	.08 (.09)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECPROX_t$	-.01 (.01)	-.07** (.02)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.04** (.01)	-.00 (.04)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while controlling for GDP (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S65. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the UK: Controlling for GDP

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	.03** (.01)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	-.37** (.14)	-.03 (.22)	-.32 (.22)	.10 (.13)	.18 (.14)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	.01* (.00)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	.01** (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	.00** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	.01** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_t	.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPV_{t-1}	.01** (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_t	.24** (.07)	.11* (.05)	.07 (.05)	.06 (.03)	-.08 (.06)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × FPU_{t-1}	.03 (.05)	-.06 (.08)	.10 (.07)	-.03 (.04)	.13* (.05)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECYEAR_t$	.05 (.11)	.21* (.09)	.08 (.06)	.02 (.04)	.00 (.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $ELECPROX_t$	-.01 (.02)	-.05 (.03)	-.02 (.02)	.00 (.01)	-.04* (.02)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while controlling for GDP (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S66. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the US: Controlling for GDP

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × $MARG_{t-1}$	-.02 (.01)	.11** (.03)	-.11 (.07)	-.10** (.03)	-.02* (.01)	-.03 (.02)	.02 (.03)	-.00 (.00)	.05* (.02)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × LPR_t	.18 (.17)	.08 (.42)	-.69 (.88)	.67 (.69)	.26 (.19)	.14 (.35)	.36 (.57)	-.12 (.08)	-.41 (.38)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_t	-.01 (.00)	.04* (.02)	-.01 (.03)	-.08** (.02)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.00)	.02 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × POP_{t-1}	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.02)	-.02 (.04)	-.03 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.03 (.02)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_t	-.00 (.00)	.02* (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.04** (.01)	.00 (.00)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPV_{t-1}	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_t	-.16* (.07)	.33** (.11)	.53 (.33)	2.61** (.63)	.11 (.12)	-.10 (.14)	.37* (.18)	-.04 (.03)	-.18 (.19)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × GPU_{t-1}	.00 (.05)	-.21 (.13)	1.10* (.48)	1.97 (1.13)	.44* (.18)	.02 (.16)	.57** (.19)	-.05 (.04)	-.27 (.21)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × ELEC $YEAR_t$	.12** (.05)	-.30** (.09)	.04 (.23)	-.22 (.18)	-.06 (.04)	.21 (.12)	.09 (.15)	-.03* (.01)	-.33 (.20)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ × ELEC $PROX_t$	-.02 (.02)	.14** (.04)	-.18** (.07)	.04 (.07)	.02 (.02)	-.05 (.04)	-.10 (.06)	.01 (.01)	.09 (.07)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while controlling for GDP (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S67. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in Canada: Alternative Lag Electoral Vulnerability

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	.00*	.01*	.00**	.01	-.00	-.03**
POP_{t-1}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	.00**	.00	.00**	.00	-.00	-.02**
GPV_{t-1}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	.00**	.01**	.00**	.00	-.00	-.02**
FPV_{t-1}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	.03**	.07	.01	.01	.07**	-.18
GPU_{t-1}	(.01)	(.06)	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.10)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	-.06**	-.13	-.01	-.04	.04	-.23*
FPU_{t-1}	(.02)	(.12)	(.01)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses re-estimate the models with previous levels of electoral vulnerability created without a government ideology specification (footnote 14 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, FPV, GPU and FPU) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S68. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the UK: Alternative Lag Electoral Vulnerability

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	-.01	.00	-.00	-.00	-.01
POP_{t-1}	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	-.00	.00	-.00	.00	-.00
GPV_{t-1}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	.01**	.00	-.00	-.01*	-.00
FPV_{t-1}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-1}$ ×	.01	-.15	.09	-.06	.21**
FPU_{t-1}	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses re-estimate the models with previous levels of electoral vulnerability created without a government ideology specification (footnote 14 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, FPV and FPU) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S69. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the US: Alternative Lag Electoral Vulnerability

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.01	.02	-.02	-.04	.01	-.02	-.03	-.00	.02
$\times POP_{t-1}$	(.00)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.00	.01	-.01	-.02	.00	-.01	-.02	-.00	.01
$\times GPV_{t-1}$	(.00)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-1}$	-.13	-.21	.64	3.68**	.45**	-.04	.37	-.01	-.26
$\times GPU_{t-1}$	(.07)	(.12)	(.35)	(.83)	(.14)	(.17)	(.20)	(.03)	(.18)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses re-estimate the models with previous levels of electoral vulnerability created without a government ideology specification (footnote 14 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV and GPU) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S70. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in Canada: Two Lags Public Opinion and Dynamic Measures of Electoral Vulnerability

Canada						
	Defence	**Education**	**Environment**	**Health**	**Transport**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	.00	-.00	.00**	.00	.01**	-.00
POP_{t-2}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	.00	-.01**	.00**	-.00	.00**	.00
GPV_{t-2}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	.00	-.01**	.00**	-.00	.00**	-.00
FPV_{t-2}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	.03	-.18	-.00	-.06	-.03	-.06
GPU_{t-2}	(.02)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.11)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	.14	.11	-.07**	.20	-.83	36.78**
FPU_{t-2}	(.09)	(.13)	(.03)	(.18)	(1.27)	(12.14)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test for alternative lag structures in public opinion (footnote 13 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, FPV, GPU and FPU) at time (t – 2) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S71. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the UK: Two Lags Public Opinion and Dynamic Measures of Electoral Vulnerability

United Kingdom					
	Defence	**Education**	**Health**	**Pensions**	**Roads**
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	-.01*	.01	-.00	-.00	-.01
POP_{t-2}	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	-.00*	.00	-.00	.00	-.00
GPV_{t-2}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	-.00	.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
FPV_{t-2}	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-2}$ ×	-.00	-.13*	.00	.00	-.07
FPU_{t-2}	(.06)	(.05)	(.07)	(.05)	(.08)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test for alternative lag structures in public opinion (footnote 13 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, FPV and FPU) at time (t – 2) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S72. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy Representation in the US: Two Lags Public Opinion and Dynamic Measures of Electoral Vulnerability

United States									
	Cities	**Crime**	**Defence**	**Education**	**Environment**	**Foreign Aid**	**Health**	**Space**	**Welfare**
$PREFS_{t-2}$	.01*	-.01	.08	-.02	-.01	.02	-.05*	-.00	-.03
$\times POP_{t-2}$	(.00)	(.02)	(.05)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.00)	(.02)
$PREFS_{t-2}$	.00*	-.00	.04	-.01	-.00	.01	-.02*	-.00	-.01
$\times GPV_{t-2}$	(.00)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)
$PREFS_{t-2}$	-.02	-.30	.97	1.31	.50*	.43	.75*	-.07	.29
$\times GPU_{t-2}$	(.05)	(.16)	(.74)	(1.64)	(.22)	(.23)	(.33)	(.04)	(.26)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test for alternative lag structures in public opinion (footnote 13 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV and GPU) at time (t – 2) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (*t*). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S73. OLS Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Collective Representation in Canada

	Social Domains Combined
Vote margin ($t-1$)	.17**
	(.03)
Electoral risk (t)	-2.43
	(2.76)
Government popularity (t)	-.04
	(.05)
Government popularity ($t-1$)	-.00
	(.07)
Government potential vulnerability (t)	-.02
	(.03)
Government potential vulnerability ($t-1$)	.00
	(.04)
Formateur potential vulnerability (t)	-.03
	(.03)
Formateur potential vulnerability ($t-1$)	-.02
	(.04)
Government potential uncertainty (t)	.21
	(.54)
Government potential uncertainty ($t-1$)	.49
	(.57)
Formateur potential uncertainty (t)	1.12
	(.70)
Formateur potential uncertainty ($t-1$)	.53
	(.72)
Election year (t)	-2.12*
	(.86)
Electoral proximity (t)	.29
	(.27)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test whether electoral incentives have an effect on collective representation, whereby social domains are taken together. The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public opinion and electoral incentive based on OLS models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S74. OLS Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Collective Representation in the UK

	Social Domains Combined
Vote margin ($t-1$)	-.29* (.11)
Electoral risk (t)	3.62 (2.45)
Government popularity (t)	-.06 (.07)
Government popularity ($t-1$)	.15 (.07)
Government potential vulnerability (t)	-.02 (.03)
Government potential vulnerability ($t-1$)	.08 (.04)
Formateur potential vulnerability (t)	-.08 (.04)
Formateur potential vulnerability ($t-1$)	.08 (.05)
Formateur potential uncertainty (t)	-.25 (.46)
Formateur potential uncertainty ($t-1$)	1.26** (.22)
Election year (t)	.52 (.69)
Electoral proximity (t)	.10 (.20)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test whether electoral incentives have an effect on collective representation, whereby social domains are taken together. The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public opinion and electoral incentive based on OLS models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.

Table S75. OLS Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Collective Representation in the US

	Social Domains Combined
Vote margin ($t-1$)	-.05 (.09)
Electoral risk (t)	.97 (1.31)
Government popularity (t)	-.03 (.06)
Government popularity ($t-1$)	-.01 (.06)
Government potential vulnerability (t)	-.02 (.03)
Government potential vulnerability ($t-1$)	-.01 (.03)
Government potential uncertainty (t)	1.05 (.60)
Government potential uncertainty ($t-1$)	.47 (.59)
Election year (t)	-.75 (.48)
Electoral proximity (t)	.05 (.19)

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The analyses test whether electoral incentives have an effect on collective representation, whereby social domains are taken together. The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public opinion and electoral incentive based on OLS models. The dependent variable is *POLICY CHANGE* (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper.